Remaking the Science of Mind:  Psychology as Natural Science by Hatfield, Gary
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
IRCS Technical Reports Series Institute for Research in Cognitive Science
September 1994
Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as
Natural Science
Gary Hatfield
University of Pennsylvania, hatfield@phil.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports
University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-94-13.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/159
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Hatfield, Gary, "Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science" (1994). IRCS Technical Reports Series. 159.
http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/159
Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science
Abstract
Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian “physics” or “natural philosophy” of the soul.
C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Near the middle of the eighteenth
century, Krueger, Godart, and Bonnet proposed approaching the mind with the techniques of the new natural
science. At nearly the same time, Scottish thinkers placed psychology within moral philosophy, but
distinguished its “physical” laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct). British and French visual
theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments
to test these theories and to measure visual phenomena such as the duration of visual impressions. By the end
of the century there was a flourishing discipline of empirical psychology in Germany, with professorships,
textbooks, and journals. The practitioners of empirical psychology at this time typically were dualists who
included mental phenomena within nature.
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              Let us agree that "psychology" may be defined as the science of the mind
         or of mental phenomena, and that the subject matter of this science includes
         sense perception, imagination, memory, understanding or reasoning, feeling,
         and will.1  If we then interpret the term "natural science" (or "natural
         philosophy") as it was understood in the early modern period, psychology
         considered as a natural science already had a long history as the eighteenth
         century began.  The prescribed domain of subject matter was investigated by
         Aristotle under the name "_l_o_g_o_n _p_e_r_i _t_e_s _p_s_y_c_h_e_s," of which it formed a proper
         part.  This Aristotelian discipline was widely studied and taught in the early
         modern period under the title of "de anima," or, with some frequency,
         "psychologia."2  Aristotelian textbooks of philosophy placed the study of the
         soul, including the rational soul and intellect, under the rubric of physics
         or natural philosophy, together with the study of basic physical principles,
         _________________________
         *Forthcoming as chapter 7 of _I_n_v_e_n_t_i_n_g _H_u_m_a_n _S_c_i_e_n_c_e, ed. Christopher Fox
         and Roy Porter (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).
         The author is grateful to the Department of Special Collections, University
         Library, University of Pennsylvania, for facilitating his use of the rare
         books collection.
         1.  "Psychology" was so defined in major textbooks into the 1920s: Eduard
         Beneke, _L_e_h_r_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e _a_l_s _N_a_t_u_r_w_i_s_s_e_n_s_c_h_a_f_t, 2d ed. (Berlin,
         1845), 1; Theodor Waitz, _G_r_u_n_d_l_e_g_u_n_g _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1878;
         reprint of 1st ed., Hamburg, 1846), 8-9; Wilhelm Fridolin Volkmann,
         _G_r_u_n_d_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e (Halle, 1856), 2-3; Wilhelm Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_z_u"_g_e _d_e_r
         _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_s_c_h_e_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e (Leipzig, 1874), 1-3; William James, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y,
         Briefer Course (New York, 1892), 1; George Trumbull Ladd, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y,
         _D_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_v_e _a_n_d _E_x_p_l_a_n_a_t_o_r_y (New York, 1895), 1-2; Harvey A. Carr,
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y: _A _S_t_u_d_y _o_f _M_e_n_t_a_l _A_c_t_i_v_i_t_y (New York and London, 1925), 1.
         2.  On the origin of the terms "psychologia" and "psychology": Francois H.
         Lapointe, "Who Originated the Term ’Psychology’?" _J_o_u_r_n_a_l _o_f _t_h_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
         _t_h_e _B_e_h_a_v_i_o_r_a_l _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s 8 (1972): 328-35.
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         body in general, and the heavens.3  Although the "new philosophers" of the
         seventeenth century uniformly rejected (in their various ways) the
         Aristotelian theory of the soul as the substantial form of the body,4 they did
         not always deviate from the Aristotelian conception of physics as the science
         of nature in general, including the human mind.  As the eighteenth century
         opened, then, it was an academic commonplace that the science of the mind or
         soul belongs to physics or the science of nature.
              Eighteenth-century writers made many proposals for changing or newly
         founding the study of the human mind.  A few contended that the study of the
         mind could not be made sufficiently rigorous to rank as a science.5  The most
         famous was Immanuel Kant, though he nonetheless put empirical psychology under
         the rubric of physics (_p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_a) and remained committed to the
         applicability of the law of cause to all psychological phenomena.6  But many
         _________________________
         3.  Seventeenth-century textbooks, early and late: Franco Burgersdijck
         (1590-1636; professor of physics at Leiden), _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m _p_h_y_s_i_c_u_m,
         _d_i_s_p_u_t_a_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s _X_X_X_I_I _a_b_s_o_l_u_t_u_m, _t_o_t_a_m _n_a_t_u_r_a_l_e_m _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_m _p_r_o_p_o_n_e_n_s, 4th
         ed. (Oxford, 1664); Pierre Barbay (d. 1664; professor of philosophy at
         Paris), _I_n _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_m _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_m _i_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o, 6th ed. (Paris,
         1700), "Compendii physici"; idem, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_s _i_n _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_y_s_i_c_a_m, 5th
         ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1690); Eustace of St. Paul (1573-1640; a Feuillant
         within the Cistercian Order), _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _q_u_a_d_r_i_p_a_r_t_i_t_a (Cologne,
         1638), part 3, "Physica"; Bartholemew Keckermann (ca. 1571-1608; Lutheran
         theologian, professor of philosophy at Danzig), "Systematis physici," in
         vol. 1 of his _O_p_e_r_v_m _o_m_n_i_v_m, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1614); Philipp Melanchthon,
         _I_n_i_t_i_a _d_o_c_t_r_i_n_a_e _p_h_y_s_i_c_a_e, in his _O_p_e_r_a, 28 vols. (Halle, 1834-60), 13:197;
         idem, _L_i_b_e_r _d_e _a_n_i_m_a, ibid., 13:5-9.  The Aristotelian concept of _s_o_u_l
         (_p_s_y_c_h_e, _a_n_i_m_a) extended to vegetative (e.g., nutritive and reproductive),
         as well as sensory and intellectual, powers and capacities.
         4.  Seventeenth-century challenges to the Aristotelian theory of the soul
         included Hobbes’s materialistic treatment of mind, the substance dualism of
         Descartes and his followers, and Leibniz’s theory of monadic substances in
         preestablished harmony.
         5.  Julius B. von Rohr, _U_n_t_e_r_r_i_c_h_t _v_o_n _d_e_r _K_u_n_s_t, _d_e_r _m_e_n_s_c_h_e_n _G_e_m"_u_t_h_e_r _z_u
         _e_r_f_o_r_s_c_h_e_n (Leipzig, 1721); Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, _D_e
         _l’_e_s_p_r_i_t _d_e_s _l_o_i_x (Geneva, 1748), book I, chap. 1, pp. 3-5.
         6.  Gary Hatfield, "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology:
         Psychology as Science and as Philosophy," in _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _C_o_m_p_a_n_i_o_n _t_o _K_a_n_t,
         ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 200-27.
         Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_z_u"_g_e, 6, credited J. F. Herbart with discrediting Kant’s
         objection that psychology cannot be a natural science because mathematics
         cannot be applied to "inner sense," through Herbart’s observation that
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         authors, British, French, Swiss, and especially German, proposed and sought to
         practice an "experimental"--that is, an "empirical" and "observational"--
         "science of the mind," a scientific psychology.  Quantitative study, though
         rare, was not entirely absent, and there was a large body of systematic
         theorizing based on appeals to immediate experience and to observations of
         ordinary behavior.  This activity was surveyed by F. A. Carus in his
         _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e of 1808, in which he discussed more than 125
         eighteenth-century authors, mostly German, but also British, French, Swiss,
         Italian, Spanish, and Swedish, who wrote psychological works of some type, the
         majority placing psychology under the rubric of natural science.7  Max
         Dessoir, writing a century later in his history of modern German psychology,
         maintained that "in the eighteenth century psychology assumed the same
         position as natural science in the seventeenth century and epistemology in the
         nineteenth," that is, the position as the central "philosophical"
         discipline.8  The psychologies of the eighteenth century retained vitality,
         especially in Britain and Germany, into the second half of the nineteenth
         century, when a "new psychology" was proclaimed.
              This description of psychology in the seventeenth and eighteenth
         centuries contradicts received historiography.  Recent general histories of
         psychology, written by psychologists, agree that natural scientific psychology
         arose only in the second half of the nineteenth century.9  Other historians,
         _________________________
         sensations have both temporal position and intensive magnitude; oddly, Kant
         was himself committed to the assertion that all sensations have intensive
         magnitude: see _K_r_i_t_i_k _d_e_r _r_e_i_n_e_n _V_e_r_n_u_n_f_t, 2d ed. (Riga, 1787), 207, which
         makes this methodological objection, expressed in the preface of his
         _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_s_c_h_e _A_n_g_a_n_g_s_g_r"_u_n_d_e _d_e_r _N_a_t_u_r_w_i_s_s_e_n_s_c_h_a_f_t (Riga, 1786), especially
         difficult to understand.
         7.  Friedrich A. Carus, _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e (Leipzig, 1808), 522-760.
         8.  Max Dessoir, _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _n_e_u_e_r_e_n _d_e_u_t_s_c_h_e_n _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d ed.
         (Berlin, 1897-1902), 358.
         9.  Edwin G. Boring, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2d ed. (New York:
         Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950); Duane P. Shultz and Syndney Ellen Schultz,
         _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _M_o_d_e_r_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y (San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987);
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         taking their cue from this historiography, have sought to explain why
         psychology did not arise in the previous centuries.10  Only a few recent
         studies treat the earlier calls for a "natural scientific" psychology as
         anything but empty rhetoric.11  And I have found no recent author who
         acknowledges that psychology was considered a natural science as the
         eighteenth century opened, that it had been so considered in Europe for
         several centuries, and that offshoots of the tradition in which it was so
         considered remained vital, even among figures deemed important in the standard
         historiography, into the second half of the nineteenth century.
              The contradiction between my description of eighteenth-century psychology
         and the traditional historiography arises partly from differing understandings
         of the concepts _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y and _n_a_t_u_r_a_l _s_c_i_e_n_c_e.  In the past half-century,
         since the writings of E. G. Boring, there has been a decided tendency to
         equate "natural scientific psychology" with "quantitative, experimental
         psychology," and to contrast the "scientific" character of this psychology
         with the "metaphysical" character of its earlier namesake.12  This tendency is
         _________________________
         Richard Lowry, _E_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _T_h_e_o_r_y: _A _C_r_i_t_i_c_a_l _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
         _C_o_n_c_e_p_t_s _a_n_d _P_r_e_s_u_p_p_o_s_i_t_i_o_n_s, 2d ed. (New York, Aldine Publishing Co.,
         1982);  Daniel N. Robinson, _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_a_l _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, rev. ed.
         (New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981).
         10.  Graham Richards, "The Absence of Psychology in the Eighteenth Century:
         A Linguistic Perspective," _S_t_u_d_i_e_s _i_n _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _a_n_d _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _S_c_i_e_n_c_e 23
         (1992): 195-211.
         11.  Christopher Fox, "Defining Eighteenth-Century Psychology: Some Problems
         and Perspectives," in _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y _a_n_d _L_i_t_e_r_a_t_u_r_e _i_n _t_h_e _E_i_g_h_t_e_e_n_t_h _C_e_n_t_u_r_y,
         ed. Christopher Fox (New York: AMS Press, 1987), 1-22; Rolf Jeschonnek,
         introduction to the reprint of Carus’s _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e (Berlin and New York:
         Springer Verlag, 1990), 17-37; Eckart Scheerer, "Psychologie," in
         _H_i_s_t_o_r_i_s_c_h_e_s _W"_o_r_t_e_r_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e, ed. Joachim Ritter (Basel: Schwabe,
         1971-), vol. 7, col. 1599-1653; Fernando Vidal, "Psychology in the 18th
         Century," _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s 6 (1993): 89-119.
         12.  The history of psychology may be told from different perspectives
         depending on the current understanding of psychology itself; cognitive or
         mentalistic studies are differently valued in histories written by
         behaviorist as opposed to cognitive psychologists: e.g., compare J. R.
         Kantor, _S_c_i_e_n_t_i_f_i_c _E_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2 vols. (Chicago: Principia
         Press, 1963-69), with Robinson, _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_a_l _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y.
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         not surprising: the growth of psychology as a scientific discipline has been
         built on its claim to have applied quantitative experimental rigor to subject
         matters about which philosophers and metaphysicians only talked and
         speculated.  If one equates modern science with quantitative science, then
         there seemingly was no scientific psychology prior to the well-known uses of
         quantitative experimental techniques after 1850.  If one attempts to confine
         modern science to its ostensibly nonmetaphysical moments, then patently
         metaphysical theorists and experimentalists must be excluded, or their work
         must be "sanitized" of the offending content.  These two constraints on
         legitimacy conjointly explain why the great body of eighteenth-century
         literature claiming to found a natural scientific psychology has been ignored
         by historians of psychology, despite the historical continuity between the
         eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the faculty tradition in Germany, and
         in the associationist traditions in both Germany and Britain.
              The equation of natural science with antimetaphysical, quantitative
         experimentation is problematic on two counts.  As an approach to history, it
         partakes of the worst failings of "presentism" or "Whig" history: it ignores
         the self-understanding of earlier figures who considered themselves
         practitioners of natural science, and it redescribes their cognitive activity
         and intellectual products from the standpoint of the presently ruling party,
         in this case, the community of experimental psychologists and their historians
         and apologists.  Philosophically, it makes a crude positivist assumption that
         all progress in science is progress in the quantitative description of natural
         phenomena.  This philosophical position should be resisted: not all natural
         scientific achievements are fundamentally quantitative, including achievements
         in two sciences that are closely related to psychology, namely, physiology and
         biology (consider the discovery of neurons, or the development of the theory
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         of evolution).  Moreover, in the early history of physics an important role
         was played by conceptual innovation as opposed to quantitative prediction or
         modeling, as exemplified in Descartes’ contribution to the development of the
         concept of a unified celestial and terrestrial physics, (metaphysically)
         grounded on a small set of basic concepts, laws, and patterns of
         explanation.13  One should not rule out the possibility that in psychology,
         too, important conceptual work preceded quantitative experimentation.
         Moreover, we may well find that although quantitative, experimental psychology
         became widespread under that name only in the second half of the nineteenth
         century, a continuous tradition of quantitative observation in sensory
         physiology and psychology stands behind that development.
         A Contextualist Approach to the Origin of "Natural Scientific" Psychology
              My approach to the historical question of whether there was an
         eighteenth-century scientific psychology14 is to begin with the concepts of
         _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y and _n_a_t_u_r_a_l _s_c_i_e_n_c_e as they were understood in that century.
         During that time, psychology was the science of mind or soul, or of mental
         phenomena; as such, it was known under many names, deriving from "psyche,"
         "anima," "soul," "mind," and their cognates.15  Mind and soul were often, but
         _________________________
         13.  I. B. Cohen, _N_e_w_t_o_n_i_a_n _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n (Cambridge: Cambridge University
         Press, 1980), 182-9; Gary Hatfield, "Metaphysics and the New Science," in
         _R_e_a_p_p_r_a_i_s_a_l_s _o_f _t_h_e _S_c_i_e_n_t_i_f_i_c _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n, ed. David Lindberg and Robert
         Westman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 93-166.
         14.  In essence, I am asking about the presence of the _d_i_s_c_i_p_l_i_n_e of
         psychology.  The term "discipline" can be understood in several ways, e.g.,
         as the province of members of a professional society, as the province of the
         members of a recognized institutional administrative structure such as a
         university department, as a subject taught in school, or as a division of
         knowledge characterized by its subject matter and methodology.  Here I am
         emphasizing the latter two senses of the word.
         15.  Many historical investigations, including Vidal’s helpful "Psychology
         in the Encyclopedias," have focused on the origin of the word "psychology,"
         as opposed to the origin of psychology as a discipline.  But the etiology of
         concepts must be distinguished from the (allied) histories of word usage.
         The science of the mind was known under many titles in the eighteenth
         century, including "the science of the mind," "the theory of mind,"
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         not always, equated.  The mind or soul was considered by many to be a natural
         being, a thing in nature.  "Science" was applied to any systematic body of
         thought, and need not have connoted an empirical basis.  "Natural science" was
         equated with "physics," in the etymological sense of that term; it was the
         science of nature.16  In the seventeenth and throughout much of the eighteenth
         centuries this science included the whole of nature, comprising a subject
         matter that we would now range under the headings of physics, physical
         astronomy, chemistry, biology, physiology, and psychology.  It might or might
         not have been ascribed metaphysical foundations by its practitioners.
              Given these understandings of the terms and the areas of study they
         denote, psychology was considered by a great many eighteenth-century authors
         to be a science.  This was so whether psychology was treated as a science of
         mental phenomena or of mental substance.  Many considered it to be a natural
         science based on experience, including those who considered themselves to be
         studying an immaterial substance.  A minority of the latter group followed
         Christian Wolff in placing psychology under the rubric of metaphysics rather
         than physics.  This fact, however, requires careful interpretation, for Wolff
         also placed cosmology (general physics, including planetary astronomy and the
         laws of motion) under metaphysics, and he allowed that metaphysical principles
         could and should be established empirically.17  Thus, if one takes
         _________________________
         "psychology," "psychologie," "Psychologie," and "Seelenlehre."  Related
         disciplines included "anthropology," or the "science of man," which often
         included "psychology" as a subdiscipline, and "pneumatics," "pneumatology,"
         or "Geisterlehre," which considered spirits (immaterial beings).
         16.  For eighteenth-century definitions (explicit and implicit) of the terms
         in quotation marks in this paragraph, see Ephraim Chambers, _C_y_c_l_o_p_a_e_d_i_a, _o_r
         _A_n _U_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_l _D_i_c_t_i_o_n_a_r_y _o_f _A_r_t_s _a_n_d _S_c_i_e_n_c_e_s, 2d ed. (London, 1738), 2
         vols.; Kant, _K_r_i_t_i_k _d_e_r _r_e_i_n_e_n _V_e_r_n_u_n_f_t, Methodenlehre, part 3 (Kant uses
         the Latin term "physiologia" for the science of nature).
         17.  Christian Wolff, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s _s_i_v_e _l_o_g_i_c_a, 3d ed. (Frankfurt
         am Main/Leipzig, 1740): philosophical cognition requires "historical"
         cognition of facts (#50) and metaphysics is a species of philosophy (#79).
         Further, psychology is a part of metaphysics, and it requires cognition of
         facts from experience in both its empirical and rational branches:
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         eighteenth-century conceptions of psychology seriously across the board, as I
         intend to do, one is committed to allowing immaterial substances as a
         (putative) object of empirical study.
              This last observation, even cushioned as it is by the surrounding
         contextualist historical methodology, is likely to shock modern sensibilities.
         This shock is another manifestation of our use of present standards (and
         mythologies) to judge past materials.  Immaterial substances are not in the
         list of likely theoretical posits in current psychology and physiology.  One
         way of interpreting this fact is to think that such posits were part of a
         religious worldview that was overcome with the Enlightenment rejection of
         superstition and authority.18  "Reason," so the story often goes, has shown us
         that dualism and other mind-positing ontologies are empty or incoherent.
              This way of understanding the Enlightenment and the dictates of reason is
         itself unreflective and simplistic.  It is true that many an Enlightenment
         _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_e is justly portrayed as rejecting God and the soul on rational
         grounds, in opposition to tradition and authority.  But one should not leap to
         the converse conclusion, for it is not true that all those who posited
         immaterial substances were blind followers of tradition and authority.
         Indeed, a chief characteristic of many who were metaphysical realists about
         the soul was their appeal to reason or intellect in establishing their
         ontologies: Descartes is the most notorious example.  In any event, if one
         believes that immaterial entities exist and that some of them inhabit human
         bodies, it makes good sense to seek to determine the powers and capacities of
         such substances empirically, by studying the manifestation of the mind in the
         behavior of others and in one’s own experience of mental phenomena.  From this
         _________________________
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, new ed. (Frankfurt am Main/Leipzig, 1738), ##1-4.
         18.  Roy Porter, _T_h_e _E_n_l_i_g_h_t_e_n_m_e_n_t (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities
         Press International, 1990), especially chaps. 4, 8.
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         point of view, taking an empirical approach to immaterial substances is an
         extremely rational undertaking.  How else is one to determine their powers?19
              My thesis in this chapter is that psychology as a natural science was not
         _i_n_v_e_n_t_e_d during the eighteenth century, but _r_e_m_a_d_e.  As the century opened,
         the science of the mind included several dimensions: charting the
         "faculties"--the capacities and powers--of mind was foremost.  Associated with
         this task were metaphysical questions about the ontology of the mind and its
         faculties, and about their relation to body and to specific bodily organs,
         especially the brain.  These questions were posed within various metaphysical
         frameworks; the three most widely discussed were the Aristotelian, Cartesian,
         and Leibnizian.  As the century proceeded, new conceptions of psychology were
         proposed or implicitly adopted.  The Aristotelian ontology of form and matter
         faded; most psychological authors adopted some version of mind-matter dualism.
         But the faculty-based approach continued to dominate the most prevalent form
         of dualistic psychology, "Ehrfahrungsseelenlehre," or the empirical doctrine
         of the soul or mind.  Ontological questions were bracketed in order to
         concentrate on study of mental faculties through their empirical
         manifestations in mental phenomena and exteral behavior.  This approach arose
         prior to midcentury in Britain, Switzerland, France, and Germany.  It was
         _________________________
         19.  Aristotelians also quite reasonably took an empirical attitude toward
         the powers of the soul, considered as powers of an animating principle.  A
         similar point might be made about the study of an immaterial supreme being;
         hence, the extensive practice of "natural theology" during the eighteenth
         century.  There is a tension between characterizations of the Enlightenment
         as "the Age of Reason" and as anticlerical and secular.  "Enlightenment" has
         two distinct connotations, one based on cognitive attitude or "method,"
         another on content and conclusion.  According to the first, it means
         "thinking for one’s self"; to the second, it includes rejection of the
         immaterial beings posited in many religions.  Tension arises because supreme
         rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz "thought for themselves" and
         claimed to establish the existence of God and the soul through reason.  This
         apparent conflict should, I think, serve to sensitize us to the changing
         content assigned to reason or "the rational" in the modern period.
                                             - 10 -
         pursued most extensively in the latter, where there were numerous calls for an
         autonomous empirical psychology.  Psychological theorizing was only rarely
         pursued as part of an attempt to cast doubt on (or to secure) the existence of
         immaterial souls or their connection with things divine.20
              An alternative to faculty psychology began to be widely discussed in the
         middle of the eighteenth century: the associationist theory of mind.  Hume,
         David Hartley, and others attempted to explain many or all phenomena of mind
         by appeal to laws of association.21  The organization of their discussions
         largely followed the faculty-based division of psychological phenomena into
         sense perception, imagination, memory, and  will, but a new explanatory schema
         was applied to these phenomena, one that promised explanatory unification
         under a few basic laws.  Associationists reduced the powers of the mind to
         one, the ability to receive impressions, and they sought to explain the
         interactions among these impressions by appeal to the laws of association
         (which often numbered three).  At first pursued most vigorously in Britain and
         France, with the translation of associationist works into German this approach
         came to be acknowledged in German psychology and found several German
         adherents.  A variant of the associationist approach found a vigorous German
         proponent just after the turn of the century, in a quantitative statement by
         _________________________
         20.  The most notable exceptions are the French materialists, including
         Diderot, La Mettrie, d’Holbach, and Helvetius, though their actual
         contribution to the development of psychological theory is questionable.
         Another exception is Samuel Strutt, whose _A _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _E_n_q_u_i_r_y _i_n_t_o _t_h_e
         _P_h_y_s_i_c_a_l _S_p_r_i_n_g _o_f _H_u_m_a_n _A_c_t_i_o_n_s, _a_n_d _t_h_e _I_m_m_e_d_i_a_t_e _C_a_u_s_e _o_f _T_h_i_n_k_i_n_g
         (London, 1732) argues that the only conceivable cause of motion in the human
         body is material.
         21.  David Hume, _A _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _H_u_m_a_n _N_a_t_u_r_e, _B_e_i_n_g _a_n _A_t_t_e_m_p_t _t_o _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_e
         _t_h_e _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _M_e_t_h_o_d _o_f _R_e_a_s_o_n_i_n_g _i_n_t_o _M_o_r_a_l _S_u_b_j_e_c_t_s, 3 vols. (London,
         1739-40), I.i.4, pp. 10-13; David Hartley (1705-57; physician, philosopher,
         and Christian apologist), _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _M_a_n, _H_i_s _F_r_a_m_e, _H_i_s _D_u_t_y, _a_n_d _H_i_s
         _E_x_p_e_c_t_a_t_i_o_n_s, 2 vols. (London, 1749), I.i, 1:5-114.  On the background to
         associationism, emphasizing its roots in Aristotle, see William Hamilton’s
         notes in his edition of the _W_o_r_k_s _o_f _T_h_o_m_a_s _R_e_i_d, 2d ed. (Edinburgh, 1849),
         note D**, 889-910 (thanks to Suzanne Senay for this reference).
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         J. F. Herbart.22
              In support of my thesis I first describe the state of psychology as the
         eighteenth century opened, and then chart the development of various new or
         modified natural scientific conceptions of or approaches to psychology and its
         subject matter.
         Psychology Circa 1700
              The science of the soul in its _D_e _a_n_i_m_a-inspired form was discussed in
         four literatures in the seventeenth century: it constituted a considerable
         chunk of the typical seventeenth-century university textbook in Aristotelian
         physics, occupying from a fourth to a third of the total number of pages;23 it
         was the subject of numerous commentaries on Aristotle’s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a;24 it was
         _________________________
         22.  In Britain, beyond Hume and Hartley, associationism received a thorough
         statement by Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), M.D., in his _Z_o_o_n_o_m_i_a; _o_r, _T_h_e _L_a_w_s
         _o_f _O_r_g_a_n_i_c _L_i_f_e, 2 vols. (London, 1794-96), who used the more general term
         "habit," of which association formed a species (II.ii.11, 1:12-13); this
         work went through three German editions between 1795 and 1805.  Charles
         Bonnet, _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e (London, 1755 [1754]), chaps. 4, 8, 20, 29 (pp.
         11-12, 19-20, 45-9, 87-8), discussed a principle of association, under the
         title "r’eproduction des id’ees," which he explained via an interaction
         between the soul and vibrating fibers in the brain; see also his _E_s_s_a_i
         _a_n_a_l_y_t_i_q_u_e _s_u_r _l_e_s _f_a_c_u_l_t’_e_s _d_e _l’_a_m_e, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Copenhagen and
         Geneva, 1769), chaps. 25-26, and his "Sur l’association des id’ees en
         g’eneral," preliminary essay to his _P_a_l_i_n_g’_e_n’_e_s_i_e _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_q_u_e, in his
         _O_e_u_v_r_e_s _d’_h_i_s_t_o_i_r_e _n_a_t_u_r_e_l_l_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e, 18 vols. (Neuchatel, 1779-
         83), 15:143-56.  Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) published two
         important works in psychology, _L_e_h_r_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e (Ko"nigsberg and
         Leipzig, 1816) and _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e _a_l_s _W_i_s_s_e_n_s_c_h_a_f_t _n_e_u _g_e_g_r_u"_n_d_e_t _a_u_f _E_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g,
         _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_k _u_n_d _M_a_t_h_e_m_a_t_i_k, 2 vols. (Ko"nigsberg, 1824-25); he sought to
         construct mental life using a "law of reproduction," which was itself
         derived from interactions among representations, on which, see Gary
         Hatfield, _T_h_e _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _t_h_e _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e: _T_h_e_o_r_i_e_s _o_f _S_p_a_t_i_a_l _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n _f_r_o_m
         _K_a_n_t _t_o _H_e_l_m_h_o_l_t_z (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 122-3.
         23.  Burgersdijck, _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m _p_h_y_s_i_c_u_m, 198-343 (out of 353 pages); Barbay,
         _I_n _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_m _i_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o, 210-219 (within 191-219); Barbay,
         _I_n _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_y_s_i_c_a_m, 2:305-558 (out of 985 pages); Eustace of St. Paul,
         _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, 3:174-308 (out of 308 pages); Bartholemew Keckermann,
         "Systematis physici," cols. 1478-1657 (within 1357-1764).
         24.  Francisco Toledo, S.J. (1532-1596), _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a _u_n_a _c_u_m _q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s
         _i_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a (Cologne, 1594); Coimbra College, _I_n
         _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, 2d ed. (Lyon, ca. 1600); Antonio Rubio, S.J., Theol.D.
         (1548-1615; Professor of theology, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_m _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e
         _a_n_i_m_a (Lyon, 1620).
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         found in separate treatises labeled "psychologia," which might or might not be
         closely tied to an exposition of Aristotle’s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a;25 and it constituted
         one part of works on "human nature" or "anthropology" intended for the natural
         philosophy curriculum, which part was sometimes labeled "psychologia," by
         contrast with anatomy or "somatotomia."26  "Soul" or "anima" was, in the
         _________________________
         25.  For the earliest free-standing "psychology," see Rudolph Goclenius
         (1547-1628; professor of physics, logic, and mathematics at Marburg),
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a: _h_o_c _e_s_t, _d_e _h_o_m_i_n_i_s _p_e_r_f_e_c_t_i_o_n_e, _a_n_i_m_o (Marburg, 1594), which
         had little "psychological" (in our sense) content by comparison with the
         standard _D_e _a_n_i_m_a literature, being a collection of twelve disputations,
         each by a different author, ten of which discussed whether the soul is
         transferred from the father in the semen or is infused by God, one of which
         discussed the philosophical perfection of man in connection with an
         interpretation of Plato’s _T_i_m_a_e_u_s, and one of which discussed the seat of
         the human soul, and particularly whether the whole is in the whole and in
         each part of the whole; similarly, Fortunio Liceti (1577-1657), _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a
         _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_i_n_e, _s_i_v_e _d_e _o_r_t_u _a_n_i_m_a_e _h_u_m_a_n_a_e (Frankfurt am Main, 1606), focused
         on the origin, substantial nature, and reproductive status of the soul.
         While both of these works treat topics pertaining to the soul or "psyche,"
         they are narrowly focused compared to the usual range of _D_e _a_n_i_m_a topics
         such as was covered under the title of "psychology" in a disputation by
         Johann Conrad Dannhauer (1603-1666; Lutheran theologian, professor of
         theology at Strassburg, 1633-66), _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_u_m, _i_n _q_u_o _m_a_x_i_m_e
         _c_o_n_t_r_o_v_e_r_s_a_e _q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_e_s, _c_i_r_c_a _l_i_b_r_o_s _t_r_e_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _d_e _A_n_i_m_a,
         _p_r_o_p_o_n_u_n_t_u_r, _v_e_n_t_i_l_a_n_t_u_r, _e_x_p_l_i_c_a_n_t_u_r (Argentoranti, 1630).  Christoph
         Scheibler (1589-1653), _L_i_b_e_r _p_h_y_s_i_c_u_s _d_e _a_n_i_m_a, in his _O_p_e_r_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a, 2
         vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1665), vol. 2, also discussed the usual range of
         Aristotelian topics on the soul.  "Psychology" served as a thesis topic,
         e.g., Petrus Liungh (d. 1679), examining Laurentius Preutz, _T_h_e_o_r_e_m_a_t_a
         _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _g_e_n_e_r_a_l_i_a (Upsalla, 1655), which focused primarily on
         ontological, reproductive, and postmortem questions; sometimes particular
         topics from the subject matter of _D_e _a_n_i_m_a were examined, e.g., Abraham
         Georg Thauvonius (ca. 1622-1679), examining Petrus Joannis, _D_i_s_p_u_t_a_t_i_o
         _p_h_y_s_i_c_a _d_e _s_e_n_s_i_b_u_s (Aboae, 1655), which discussed the external and internal
         senses; Albert Linemann (1603-53; mathematician in the Academy of
         Regiomantus), examining Benjamin Crusius, _E_x_e_r_c_i_t_a_t_i_o _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a _v_i_s_i_i_o_n_i_s
         _n_a_t_u_r_a_m _p_h_y_s_i_c_i_s & _o_c_t_i_c_i_s _r_a_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s _e_x_p_l_i_c_a_t_a_m (Regiomantus, 1662), which
         discussed the doctrine of visual species in connection with Kepler’s theory
         of retinal images.
         26.  Otto Casmann (d. 1607; schoolmaster in Steinfurt), _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a
         _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_a, _s_i_v_e _a_n_i_m_a_e _h_u_m_a_n_a_e _d_o_c_t_r_i_n_a (Hannover, 1594), first treated
         "psychologia," covering the usual Aristotelian topics, and then, in _S_e_c_u_n_d_a
         _p_a_r_s _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_a_e: _H_o_c _e_s_t, _f_a_b_r_i_c_a _h_u_m_a_n_i _c_o_r_p_o_r_i_s (Hannover, 1596),
         Casmann discussed "somatotomia," or the anatomy and physiology of the body,
         including the sense organs; Fabiano Hippio (professor of physics at
         Leipzig), in _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _p_h_y_s_i_c_a, _s_i_v_e _d_e _c_o_r_p_o_r_e _a_n_i_m_a_t_o, _l_i_b_r_i _q_u_a_t_u_o_r,
         _t_o_t_i _e_x _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_l_e _d_e_s_v_m_t_i, _m_o_r_b_o_r_u_m _s_a_l_t_e_m _d_o_c_t_r_i_n_i_s _e_x _m_e_d_i_c_i_s _s_c_r_i_p_t_i_s
         _a_d_i_e_c_t_a (Frankfurt am Main, 1600), defined "psychologia physike" as
         "scientia corporis animati," explicitly leaving out any discussion of souls
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         Aristotelian tradition, understood quite broadly, to include the principles of
         growth and development, or the "substantial forms," of both plants and
         animals, including the human animal.  The Aristotelian physics textbook began
         with a discussion of general physical principles, such as the four causes, and
         the general properties of bodies, including their constitution from form and
         matter.  It then divided all bodies into "specific kinds": first, into
         celestial and terrestrial; terrestrial into simple (namely, the four elements)
         and mixed; mixed into inanimate and animate.  Animate beings were then divided
         according to the type of soul, which was denominated by its highest power.
         Thus, plants have only a vegetative soul, while nonhuman animals have
         _________________________
         not operating naturally in a body; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _p_h_y_s_i_c_a was divided into four
         books, the first treating the parts of the body, including the brain and
         animal spirits (largely free from Aristotle, including his theory of the
         brain); the second treating general questions about the soul, its faculties,
         and its relation to the body; the third treating the natural operations of
         the soul in the body, from nutrition through intellection and appetite; and
         the fourth treating medical topics concerning morbidity; Gregor Horst
         (1578-1636), in _D_e _n_a_t_v_r_a _h_v_m_a_n_a, _l_i_b_r_i _d_u_o, _q_u_o_r_u_m _p_r_i_o_r _d_e _c_o_r_p_o_r_i_s
         _s_t_r_u_c_t_u_r_a, _p_o_s_t_e_r_i_o_r _d_e _a_n_i_m_a _t_r_a_c_t_a_t (Frankfurt am Main, 1612), treated the
         usual Aristotelian topics on the soul in the second part (which originated
         as an excercise "peri tes psyches," Wittenberg, 1602) and affirmed that the
         soul is part of physics only when considered as an act of the body, but not
         as a separated substance; Tobias Knobloch (M.D. and Professor of physics),
         in _D_i_s_p_u_t_a_t_i_o_n_e_s _a_n_a_t_o_m_i_c_a_e _e_t _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_e (Leipzig, 1612), surveyed human
         anatomy in 613 of the book’s 713 pages, then treated the usual topics on the
         soul; Johann Sperling (1603-58; professor of physics at Wittenberg), in
         _P_h_y_s_i_c_a _a_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_a (Wittenberg, 1668), contended that "anthropologia" is
         part of physics because human beings are a physical species, and then in
         book 1 treated the usual topics (pp. 59-302), to which he added chapters on
         laughter and speech, and surveyed the human body in book 2 (pp. 303-780).
         Samuel Haworth (medical student and later M.D.), in _A_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_a, _o_r, _A
         _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _D_i_s_c_o_u_r_s_e _C_o_n_c_e_r_n_i_n_g _M_a_n: _B_e_i_n_g _t_h_e _A_n_a_t_o_m_y _b_o_t_h _o_f _h_i_s _S_o_u_l
         _a_n_d _B_o_d_y (London, 1680), focused in his "pneumatology" (pp. 14-73) on the
         ontology, immateriality, and immortality of the soul, giving scant attention
         to the operation of its faculties (pp. 67-73), and in his "somatology"
         surveyed anatomy and physiology, adding chapters on the sexes and the ages
         of man.  The practice arose early of including "anthropologia," treating
         body and soul, in physics texts: Johann Freig (1543-83), _Q_u_a_e_s_t_i_o_n_e_s
         _p_h_y_s_i_c_a_e (Basel, 1579), book 35, "De anthropologia et anatome" (pp. 1147-
         1237), book 36, "De anthropologia et anima hominis" (pp. 1237-90).  The
         relation between the sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century
         discipline of "anthropology" and the physical and cultural anthropology of
         the nineteenth and twentieth centuries needs further study.
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         sensitive souls (also possessed of vegetative powers), and human animals have
         rational or intellective souls (also possessed of sensitive and vegetative
         powers).
              As is apparent, the Aristotelian concept of soul did not entail
         consciousness or rationality; at its most general, it required only life.  For
         this reason, the seventeenth-century Aristotelian discipline named "de anima"
         cannot strictly be equated with the "science of mind," and hence with
         "psychology" as defined herein.  But the science of the phenomena that we now
         denominate as "mental" dominated this discipline.  In standard textbooks and
         commentaries, the vegetative soul received comparatively brief coverage; much
         greater space was given to the sensitive and rational souls.27  More
         importantly, the activities of the sensitive and rational souls were grouped
         together under the denomination "cognitive," and the sensitive and
         intellectual faculties were seen as cooperating in the process of cognition.
         Indicative of their close relation, their modes of operation were often
         compared and contrasted.28  So although the Aristotelian discipline of the
         _________________________
         27.  Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a, devoted folios 65rb-73vb to the vegetative soul,
         73vb-129ra to the sensitive, 129ra-169ra to the intellect, and 169rb-179rb
         to appetite, will, and motion; Coimbra College, _I_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a,
         devoted pp. 148-61 to the vegetative soul, 160-361 to the sensitive, 360-469
         to the intellect, 460-98 to appetite, will, and motion, with separate
         treatises on the separated soul (499-596) and on additional problems
         pertaining to the five senses (597-619); Rubio, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_m _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s
         _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, devoted pp. 278-305 to the vegetative soul, 305-632 to
         the sensitive, 633-735 to the rational, and 735-57 to appetite, will, and
         motion, adding a treatise on the separated soul (758-94).  The coverage was
         slightly more balanced in the textbooks: Burgersdijck, _C_o_l_l_e_g_i_u_m _p_h_y_s_i_c_u_m,
         devoted 229-39 to nutrition and growth, 239-71 to reproduction, 271-302 to
         the sensitive soul, 302-13 to appetite and motion, 313-33 to the intellect,
         and 333-43 to the will and freedom; Barbay, _I_n _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _p_h_y_s_i_c_a_m, devoted
         374-436 to the vegetative soul and power of generation, 437-529 to the
         sensitive soul, including appetite and motion, and 529-58 to the rational
         soul; Eustace of St. Paul, _S_u_m_m_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, "Physica," devoted 197-228 to
         the vegetative soul, 228-77 to the sensitive, including motion, and 278-308
         to the rational soul, including will.
         28.  Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a, II.12, quest. 32, folios 109vb-110ra, III.3,
         quest. 7, folios 127ra-128rb, III.7, q. 21, folios 164va-166ra; Coimbra
         College, _I_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, III.3, quest. 2, pp. 357-60, III.4, p.
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         soul is broader than the science of the mind, effectively it contained the
         study of the cognitive faculties as a subdiscipline.
              The treatment of the sensitive and rational souls, exclusive of certain
         general (and significant) ontological questions, was organized so that the
         reader followed the chain of cognition according to the famous Aristotelian
         dictum "nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses."  Under the
         rubric of the sensitive soul, the five external senses were discussed first
         and at greatest length, including the transmission of color via light, its
         reception in the sense organ and the subsequent transmission along the optic
         nerve, and the discriminative acts of the sensitive power.  Then came
         discussion of the internal senses, including the "common sense," imagination,
         memory, and the estimative power (the latter explained the undeniable, though
         limited, abilities of nonhuman animals to learn and to anticipate), followed
         by discussions of appetite and the motive power (which controls
         locomotion).29  Under the rubric of the rational soul, considerable discussion
         often was devoted to problems about the spirituality and immortality of the
         soul; other questions concerned the production of the rational soul at the
         time of conception.  Especially in the commentaries, the role of the
         intellectual faculty in cognition was analyzed extensively, focusing on its
         power to extract intelligible species (common natures, universals) from
         phantasms present in the internal senses.  The power of abstraction was
         attributed to the "agent intellect," which, together with the phantasm,
         produces an intelligible species that is received in the "patient intellect,"
         completing the act of intellection.30
         _________________________
         362, III.8, quest. 5, article 3, p. 443; Rubio, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_m _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s
         _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, II.5-6, quest. 1, p. 314, quest. 2, p. 323, III.3,
         quest. 5-6, 8, 11, pp. 606-13, 616-32, III.4-5, quest. 2, pp. 662-3.
         29.  The material treated in _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, II.5-III, which was covered in the
         textbooks and commentaries mentioned in notes 23 and 24.
         30.  Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a _i_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, III.4-7,
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              All of these discussions were considered to pertain to the physics or
         natural science of the soul, with the exception that some authors assigned to
         metaphysics discussion of the spirituality and immortality of the human
         soul.31  Accordingly, most authors contended that the study of the soul could
         be approached through "natural human reason" alone, without appeal to
         scriptural authority or divine inspiration.  The subject matter belongs in
         "natural science" on the simple grounds that it pertains to "natural" things,
         or things possessed of natures, that is, intrinsic principles of motion or
         change.  The class of "natures" was somewhat wider than we now include within
         the proper scope of the terms "natural" and "physical," because it included
         the rational soul.  At the same time, throughout the eighteenth century many
         authors included the soul, conceived as an immaterial substance distinct from
         the body, to be a thing in nature.
              We would now classify the material covered in Aristotelian psychology
         under several headings, including physiology, psychology, metaphysics, and
         epistemology.  The discussion of the external senses included the material
         characteristics of sensory qualities in bodies, the transmission of qualities
         to the sense organs, the characteristics of the sense organs and the physics
         and physiology of the reception of transmitted qualities, nervous transmission
         to the brain, and the experience and discrimination of the quality by the mind
         or soul.  The discussions of the internal senses included what we would call
         _________________________
         quest. 9-23, folios 129ra-168vb; Coimbra College, _I_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a,
         III.4-8, pp. 360-459; Rubio, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_m _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a,
         III.4-5, pp. 633-735.  The doctrine of the agent and patient intellects was
         regularly mentioned in the textbooks, e.g., Eustace of St. Paul, _S_u_m_m_a
         _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, "Physica," III.4, disputation 2, pp. 284-300.
         31.  Toledo, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_a _i_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, proem, quest.
         2 (folio 4), subsumed the soul in all of its operations under physics;
         Coimbra College, _I_n _t_r_e_s _l_i_b_r_o_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, proem, quest. 1, article 2 (pp.
         7-8) and Rubio, _C_o_m_m_e_n_t_a_r_i_u_m _i_n _l_i_b_r_o_s _A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e_l_i_s _D_e _a_n_i_m_a, proem, quest. 1
         (pp. 10-11), subsumed the study of embodied souls under physics, and the
         separated soul under metaphysics.
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         the physiology and psychology of memory, imagination, feeling, appetite; many
         would today consider these discussions as properly "naturalistic."  The theory
         of the rational soul seems least properly naturalistic from our perspective.
         Within the Aristotelian tradition, there had been a dispute over whether
         intellection is a natural function of the human soul, or derives from a higher
         intelligence.  The majority opinion, however, included intellection among the
         natural, if immaterial, powers of the human mind, and hence as proper to the
         subject matter of the part of physics that treats of the human animal.32  In
         sum, although only a portion of the material found in the _D_e _a_n_i_m_a discussions
         would now be considered proper to the natural science of psychology, in
         Aristotelian terms these discussions did constitute a natural science of soul,
         including the cognitive powers of the soul.
              Although the Aristotelian physics continued to be taught well into the
         eighteenth century (especially in France), it was being displaced.  The force
         for this displacement came first from the "mechanical philosophy," championed
         by Hobbes and Descartes (among others).  Although in general the advocates of
         the new mechanical philosophy understood the scope of physics along
         Aristotelian lines, to encompass all of nature, they differed among themselves
         _________________________
         32.  The orthodox view was that intellection is a natural power of the human
         soul, but that it differs from the sensitive powers in being immaterial; it
         is an immaterial power of the form of the human being, and hence of a form
         informing a material body.  It was ascribed immateriality "in its operation"
         on the grounds that, in order to receive "common natures" (which are
         universals) it must be capable of "becoming all things," and that any power
         that was tied to a corporeal organ for its operations would be limited by
         the materiality of the organ.  Orthodox authors nonetheless considered this
         immaterial power to be a natural power of the form of the human animal.
         Unorthodox authors denied that these powers could be produced by the
         rational soul considered as the form of the human body precisely because of
         its association with a body; they ascribed either the agent or both it and
         the patient intellects to a higher being, which the early seventeenth
         century commentator Jacopo Zabarella contended was God itself.  Thus, as the
         eighteenth century opened there was in the recent Christian Aristotelian
         corpus a minority opinion that the intellectual powers of the mind are not
         "natural" to the human psyche, but must be attributed to a divine power.
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         on where to place mental phenomena or mental substance.  Their differing
         ontologies partly explain their divergent attitudes toward psychology: the
         materialist Hobbes unproblematically placed the phenomena of mind under the
         rubric of physics, while substance dualists who distinguished mental from
         bodily substance faced a decision about where to put mind in the system of
         sciences.  Ontology was not determining: some substance dualists placed mind
         under physics, some assigned it to metaphysics, and some baptized a new
         science of mind, coordinate with but distinct from physics.
              In his _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (1656), Hobbes forthrightly placed the
         treatment of "Sense and Animall Motion" in part 4, "Physiques, or the
         _P_h_a_e_n_o_m_e_n_a of Nature."33  On the surface, this placement of the text was
         unremarkable; it departed not in the least from Aristotelian practice.  But
         given the content of Hobbes’s discussion, it was a radical departure.  In this
         chapter he discussed the phenomena of sense and imagination, the faculties
         that Aristotelians (and Cartesians) held to be shared by humans and beasts.
         He departed from the Aristotelians in contending that these phenomena should
         be equated with material motions in the bodies of animals and humans.34
         Hobbes’s thorough break with both Aristotelian and Cartesian theory becomes
         apparent when we recall that in his _L_e_v_i_a_t_h_a_n of 1651 he had reduced
         understanding or intellect to imagination: "The Imagination that is raysed in
         man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or
         other voluntary signes, is that we generally call _U_n_d_e_r_s_t_a_n_d_i_n_g; and is common
         to Man and Beast."35  The only major materialist in the seventeenth century,
         _________________________
         33.  Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, _t_h_e _F_i_r_s_t _S_e_c_t_i_o_n,
         _C_o_n_c_e_r_n_i_n_g _B_o_d_y (London, 1656; translation from Latin edition of 1655),
         chap. 25.
         34.  Ibid., chap. 25, article 2, pp. 291-2.
         35.  Hobbes, _L_e_v_i_a_t_h_a_n, _o_r _t_h_e _M_a_t_t_e_r, _F_o_r_m_e _a_n_d _P_o_w_e_r _o_f _a _C_o_m_m_o_n_w_e_a_l_t_h
         _E_c_c_l_e_s_i_a_s_t_i_c_a_l_l _a_n_d _C_i_v_i_l (London, 1651), part 1, chap. 2, p. 8.
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         Hobbes took the radical step of bringing the science of mind within the domain
         of physics by reducing physics to matter in motion and equating mental
         activity with the latter.  Of greater importance for the history of
         psychology, though, was his analysis of the regularities of imagination.  As
         later authors were to notice, Hobbes described the activity of the imagination
         in terms of a principle of association: the faculty governs the production of
         "traynes" of images according to the principle that "we have no Transition
         from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our
         Senses."36  Current transitions in imagination are limited to prior actual
         transitions, though, by Hobbes’s lights, this was not much of a limitation,
         because of the great variety of successions found in the senses: the
         combinations presented to the senses are so diverse, he thought, that "when by
         length of time very many Phantasmes have been generated within us by Sense,
         then almost any thought may arise from any other thought."37  As Hobbes
         explained, the development of rational thought depends not on any special
         faculty of the mind or immaterial agency but on proper control of the trains
         of imaginations, through their regimentation under the rules of language or
         the use of signs.  This attitude toward the human mind was to serve as an
         inspiration to several eighteenth-century thinkers (in Britain and on the
         continent), though a direct debt to Hobbes is difficult to establish because
         of citation practices (including penalties of disfavor for acknowledging
         Hobbesian influence).
              The most prominent body of seventeenth-century physics was that spawned
         by Descartes and spread in numerous books by his followers.  In his _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a
         _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e, Descartes had intended to cover the full range of the
         _________________________
         36.  Ibid., part 1, chap. 3, p. 8.
         37.  Hobbes, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s, part 4, chap. 25, article 8, p. 297.
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         traditional physics, including "the nature of plants, of animals, and above
         all, of man."  He was forced to cut his treatment short because of lack of
         means to carry out "all the experiments that I would need in order to support
         and justify my reasonings."38  In the extant portions of the _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a devoted
         to physics (parts 2-4), he discussed the bodily side of sensory activity and
         the creation of sensations in the mind, but not the essentially mental
         faculties of intellect and will.39  The latter were discussed in his
         "metaphysical _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s" and in the corresponding part 1 of the _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a,
         and it is not clear whether they would have been discussed under the rubric of
         "physics" in a completed version of the latter work.  But there is evidence to
         suggest that Descartes had intended his earlier book on physics, entitled _L_e
         _M_o_n_d_e, to extend at least to the union of soul and body: the posthumously
         published _T_r_a_i_t’_e _d_e _l’_h_o_m_m_e (originally part of _L_e _M_o_n_d_e) covered human
         physiology, including the bodily mechanisms involved in sense perception,
         imagination, memory, bodily motion, sleep, dreams, and emotions, and was to
         have examined the mind-body union.40  Further, in his _D_i_o_p_t_r_i_q_u_e, Descartes
         _________________________
         38.  The quoted phrases are from Descartes’ "Lettre de l’avthevr," which
         first appeared in the French translation, _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_e_s _d_e _l_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e
         (Paris, 1647, translated from the Latin edition, Amsterdam, 1644), 26, 29;
         English translation, Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller, _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s
         _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (Dordrecht, Boston, and Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983), xxiv,
         xxvi.  "Experiment" includes appeals to both sense experience and controlled
         observation.
         39.  Descartes, _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a, part 4, articles 189-98.  Ren’e le Bossu,
         _P_a_r_a_l_l_e_l_e _d_e_s _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_e_s _d_e _l_a _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e _d’_A_r_i_s_t_o_t_e, & _d_e _c_e_l_l_e _d_e _R_e_n’_e _d_e_s
         _C_a_r_t_e_s (Paris, 1674; reprint, Paris: J. Vrin, 1981), noted that "l’homme
         me^me, & son ame, au moins en qualit’e d’ame sensitive, sera l’objet de la
         Physique de M. des Cartes, aussi bien que tout ce qu’il y a de mat’eriel &
         d’’etendu dans le monde qu’il nomme _C_o_r_p_s" (p. 46).
         40.  Ren’e Descartes, _L’_H_o_m_m_e _d_e _R_e_n’_e _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s (Paris, 1664), 1, 29; English
         translation by Thomas Steele Hall, _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _M_a_n (Cambridge, Mass.:
         Harvard University Press, 1972), 1, 36.  It is likely that the discussion of
         mind-body union would have occurred after the lost or unwritten section of
         _L_e _M_o_n_d_e on the soul, as described in Descartes’ _D_i_s_c_o_u_r_s _d_e _l_a _m_e_t_h_o_d_e
         (Leiden, 1637), part 5; nonetheless, it would have been a part of what
         Descartes termed his "physics," to Marin Mersenne, March 1637, in _O_e_u_v_r_e_s,
         11 vols., ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1968-74),
         1:348.
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         examined the physiological processes and mental judgments involved in the
         perception of size, shape, distance, and motion.41  Subsequent Cartesian
         treatises on physics incorporated discussion of sense perception--including
         its mental aspect--within physics, but they split on whether to place
         discussion of the rational soul in physics or metaphysics.
              Jacques Rohault produced the most widely distributed textbook of Cartes-
         ian physics, which was used well into the eighteenth century.  He followed the
         extant _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a in limiting physics primarily to the material world, though
         he included discussion of both the bodily and mental aspects of sensory
         perception in treating of the qualities of bodies.  Among the senses, he again
         followed Descartes (and tradition) in treating of vision most extensively,
         including the perception of color, size, and distance, the production of an
         "_i_m_m_a_t_e_r_i_a_l Image" in the soul through brain activity, and the "judgments"
         based on that image which result in size and distance perception.42  Antoine
         Le Grand produced the first comprehensive rendering of Descartes’
         philosophy.43  Within physics, he followed scholastic practice in dividing
         physics into general and special, and inanimate and living.44  Following the
         Aristotelian order, Le Grand included the whole of what he termed the science
         of "Man" in his physics, divided into two parts, considering first the human
         _________________________
         41.  Ren’e Descartes, _D_i_o_p_t_r_i_q_u_e, part 6, published with the _D_i_s_c_o_u_r_s in
         1637.
         42.  Jacques Rohault (1618-72), _T_r_a_i_t’_e _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e (Amsterdam, 1676); idem,
         trans. John Clarke (Samuel’s brother), _S_y_s_t_e_m _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, 2d ed.,
         2 vols. (London, 1728-29; reprint, New York: Garland Publishing, 1987),
         1:248-57.
         43.  Antoine Le Grand (d. 1699), _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_i_o _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _s_e_c_u_n_d_u_m _p_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a
         _d_e _R_e_n_a_t_i _D_e_s_c_a_r_t_e_s, new ed. (London, 1678); trans. Richard Blome, _A_n _E_n_t_i_r_e
         _B_o_d_y _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, _A_c_c_o_r_d_i_n_g _t_o _t_h_e _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s _o_f _t_h_e _F_a_m_o_u_s _R_e_n_a_t_e _D_e_s
         _C_a_r_t_e_s (London, 1694; reprint, New York: Johnson, 1972).
         44.  As Descartes had himself done, Le Grand was not averse to presenting
         Cartesian philosophy using the Aristotelian terms, and so he attributed a
         "soul" to plants and animals, which turned out to be "a Heating, but not a
         Shining Fire" (Descartes’ "fire without light"): Le Grand, _B_o_d_y _o_f
         _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, book 1, part 7, introduction, article 3, p. 229b.
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         body, then the mind (agreeing with the usual division in the literature on
         "anthropologia").  The part on the body covered various bodily functions as
         well as the operation of the senses, including the production of sensations,
         or "Spiritual Images," in the soul.45  The chapter on "Mind" proper covered
         the essential nature of the mind, its union with the body, and its faculties,
         taking care to observe that its acts of intellection can be exercised
         independently of brain processes.46  In academically orthodox fashion, Le
         Grand classed these discussions under the rubric of physics or natural
         philosophy.  Pierre Regis produced a popular "system" or "entire course" of
         Descartes’ philosophy, again covering logic, metaphysics, physics, and
         morals.47  Five of seven volumes were devoted to physics, and of these, two
         and one-half to living things, of which more than one full volume was devoted
         to the senses, the other cognitive faculties, and the passions.  He emphasized
         especially the brain processes--or as he put it, the "causes physiques"--
         associated with sense, imagination, judgment, reason, and memory.  Of these
         topics, Regis devoted the greatest attention to vision, including extensive
         discussion of color perception, the formation of a "spiritual image," the
         basis of binocular single vision, size and distance perception, and the so-
         called moon illusion.  He treated all of these "psychological" topics under
         physics; he reserved discussion of the existence and nature of mind (and
         body), and the mind-body union, for metaphysics (three-fourths of one volume).
              Cartesian textbook philosophy fostered the development of psychology as
         the science of the mind in two ways.  Implicitly, its dualist ontology abetted
         _________________________
         45.  Ibid., book 1, part 8, chap. 19, article 1, p. 300a.  This placement of
         the senses mimics the Aristotelian treatises by grouping sense perception
         together with other bodily functions.
         46.  Ibid., book 1, part 9, chap. 5, article 3, p. 329a.
         47.  Pierre Sylvain Regis (1632-1707), _S_y_s_t_^e_m_e _d_e _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e: _c_o_n_t_e_n_a_n_t _l_a
         _l_o_g_i_q_u_e, _m_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e & _m_o_r_a_l_e, 7 vols. (Lyon, 1691).
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         the perception that the phenomena of mind form a single disciplinary unit.
         Descartes’ starkly drawn dualism grouped the phenomena of sensation and
         intellection (and feeling, and willing) together as "thoughts" or "mental"
         states, joined by virtue of their common containment in "consciousness," and
         united ontologically as modifications of thinking substance.  Although most of
         these phenomena were associated in Aristotelian philosophy under the rubric of
         "cognitive operations," they were not ontologically divorced from other bodily
         functions.  Second, Cartesian textbook physics reinforced the inclusion of at
         least portions of the science of the mind within natural science by including
         the study of the corporeal and bodily conditions of sense perception, and
         especially vision, within the "physics" part of the curriculum.  In the
         Aristotelian curriculum, optics was a "mixed mathematical" science (which
         meant that it applied mathematical principles to physical subject matter);
         although optical treatises themselves typically included extensive discussion
         of the "psychological" portions of the theory of vision (such as size, shape,
         and distance perception), very little discussion of such topics was included
         when the senses were examined in _D_e _a_n_i_m_a commentaries and the corresponding
         portions of the physics textbook, which focused on the ontology of sensible
         species and of the act of sensing.  By contrast, all three of the major
         Cartesian textbooks placed the psychology of vision--which would later be the
         mainstay of the new experimental psychology--squarely within physics or
         natural science.  This second contribution stands in tension with the first,
         because it mixes the discussion of a purely mental subject matter (perceptual
         experience itself) with the discussion of brain processes.  This fact can
         serve to remind us that despite substance dualism, Cartesian physics treated
         those mental processes that depend on the bodily processes in the chapters on
         _b_o_d_y.
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              Near the end of the seventeenth century, Newton’s new mechanics presented
         itself as a rival to Cartesian physics.  It would be several decades before it
         clearly displaced the Cartesian physics, and several more (until near the
         century’s end) before the older conception of physics as the science of nature
         in general, including psychology, was displaced by the narrower conception of
         experimental, mathematical physics familiar to us now.48  Newton himself wrote
         as if his work in mechanics and optics were just two instances of a new
         approach that could be extended to other areas of the science of nature.49  He
         promoted this extension to physiology in the Queries to the _O_p_t_i_c_k_s, where he
         speculated on the vibratory character of both sensory and motor nervous
         transmission.  Also in the Queries, he expressed a commitment to a "sensitive
         substance" that he implicitly characterized as "incorporeal."50  Newton thus
         opted for mind-matter dualism.  The most prolific textbook writers among his
         followers, ’sGravesande and Musschenbroek, made this commitment explicit.
         Willem Jacob ’sGravesande equated the subject matter of physics with "natural
         things," by which he meant "all bodies"; within the division of sciences, he
         placed the human mind under metaphysics.51  His Netherlandish friend and
         _________________________
         48.  William R. Shea, "The Unfinished Revolution: Johann Bernoulli (1667-
         1748) and the Debate between the Cartesians and the Newtonians," in
         _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n_s _i_n _S_c_i_e_n_c_e: _T_h_e_i_r _M_e_a_n_i_n_g _a_n_d _R_e_l_e_v_a_n_c_e, ed. William R. Shea
         (Canton, Mass.: Science History Publications, 1988), 70-92; Thomas Hankins,
         _S_c_i_e_n_c_e _a_n_d _t_h_e _E_n_l_i_g_h_t_e_n_m_e_n_t (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
         chap. 3; Gary Hatfield, "Was the Scientific Revolution Really a Revolution
         in Science?" in _T_r_a_d_i_t_i_o_n, _T_r_a_n_s_m_i_s_s_i_o_n, _a_n_d _T_r_a_n_s_f_o_r_m_a_t_i_o_n, ed. Jamil Ragep
         and Stephen Livesay (Amsterdam: E. J. Brill, in press).
         49.  Isaac Newton, _M_a_t_h_e_m_a_t_i_c_a_l _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, 2 vols.,
         trans. Florian Cajori (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
         Press, 1966), 1:13, where he stated a wish to "derive the rest of the
         phenomena of nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical
         principles," and acknowledged that the needed principles remained unknown.
         50.  Isaac Newton, _O_p_t_i_c_k_s, _o_r, _A _t_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _t_h_e _R_e_f_l_e_c_t_i_o_n_s, _R_e_f_r_a_c_t_i_o_n_s,
         _I_n_f_l_e_c_t_i_o_n_s & _C_o_l_o_u_r_s _o_f _L_i_g_h_t, after the 4th ed. (London, 1730), ed. Duane
         H. D. Roller (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), Queries 12, 14-16, 23-24,
         28, pp. 345-7, 353-4, 370.
         51.  Willem Jacob van ’sGravesande (1688-1742; professor of mathematics at
         Leiden), _M_a_t_h_e_m_a_t_i_c_a_l _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, _C_o_n_f_i_r_m’_d _b_y
         _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_s, _o_r _A_n _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o_n _t_o _S_i_r _I_s_a_a_c _N_e_w_t_o_n’_s _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, 6th ed., 2
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         colleague Petrus van Musschenbroek developed a more elaborate partition of
         philosophy, which included the logic, metaphysics, physics (limited to space
         and body), and moral philosophy of the traditional curriculum, augmented by
         teleology and by pneumatics, or the science of spirits.52  Unlike scholastic
         Aristotelian psychology, pneumatics comprehended all spirits, finite and
         infinite.  It also comprehended the union of spirit with body, which Cartesian
         dualists had sometimes placed in physics, sometimes in metaphysics.
              In displacing the reigning Aristotelian natural philosophy, the Cartesian
         and Newtonian systems affected psychology in two ways.  First, they ushered in
         dualism as the reigning ontology of the mind-matter relation.  Second, they
         disrupted the traditional classification of mental phenomena under physics,
         creating uncertainty about where the study of the mind fit into the system of
         sciences; some placed it within physics, while others distributed the
         discussion between physics and metaphysics, and still others subsumed the
         human mind under pneumatics.  Substance dualism thus did not necessarily lead
         to the divorce of psychology from its previous position within natural
         science: it did among the close followers of Newton, but not among all
         Cartesians.
              The physics curriculum proper was not the only locus for discussion of
         the mind or mental phenomena.  Throughout the seventeenth century and into the
         eighteenth these phenomena were discussed in a great many disciplinary
         _________________________
         vols., trans. J. T. Desaguliers (London, 1747), 1:1-2.  In his _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o
         _a_d _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_m; _m_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a_m _e_t _l_o_g_i_c_a_m _c_o_n_t_i_n_e_n_s, 2d ed. (Leiden, 1737),
         he discussed the human mind in book 1, "Metaphysica," part 2, "De mente
         humana," covering intellect, freedom, the mind-body nexus, and the origin of
         ideas (pp. 38-105); in book 2, "Logica," he discussed how the mind should be
         directed in order to acquire a cognition of things (pp. 106-342, with an
         appendix on the syllogism, pp. 345-75).
         52.  Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761; professor of philosophy and
         mathematics at Utrecht), _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, 2 vols., trans. Pierre Massuet
         (Leyden, 1739), chap. 1, section 2, 1:2; _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y,
         trans. John Colson (London, 1744), chap. 1, section 2, pp. 2-3.
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         contexts.  In the traditional philosophical curriculum, moral philosophy
         applied the physics of mind in moral psychology; logic (Aristotelian and non-
         Aristotelian) discussed the faculties or powers of the mind in relation to
         their proper use, including especially the cognitive faculties relevant to the
         logical acts of conception, judgment, and reasoning.  In other contexts, the
         mind and mental phenomena were studied empirically as part of the domain of
         nature, but the relation to physics proper was indefinite or secondary.
         Optics, which was classically defined as the theory of vision, was throughout
         the eighteenth century considered by many to be a branch of applied
         mathematics.53  Long after Newton published his own _O_p_t_i_c_k_s, which focused
         narrowly on the physics of light, optics continued to be pursued as a complete
         theory of vision, including perceptual phenomena and the mind’s contribution
         to perception.54  Further, medical physiology had long included discussion of
         the operation of the senses and other cognitive faculties.  Others studied the
         mind in order to determine the grounds and limits of human knowledge.  Locke’s
         _E_s_s_a_y is the most noted example of an empirically based ("plain, historical")
         approach to the human mind considered as a cognitive power.  Although his
         project has often been characterized as an early attempt at natural scientific
         psychology, Locke himself clearly distinguished his inquiry into the
         "Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge" from a "Physical
         _________________________
         53.  E.g., Johann Samuel Traugott Gehler (1751-95), _P_h_y_s_i_k_a_l_i_s_c_h_e_s
         _W"_o_r_t_e_r_b_u_c_h, new ed., 6 vols. (Leipzig, 1798-1801), "Optik," 3:385.
         54.  Even the Newtonians continued to include the theory of vision in the
         optical portions of their physics books: ’sGravesande, _M_a_t_h_e_m_a_t_i_c_a_l _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s
         _o_f _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, though patterning his treatment of optics after
         Newton’s narrow view, so that he treated motion, inflection, refraction, and
         reflection (vol. 2, book 5), nonetheless provided a summary discussion of
         visual perception (2:175-81); Musschenbroek, _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, discussed
         the properties of light, refraction, and reflection (chaps. 27-31), followed
         by a discussion of the eye and vision, including optical anatomy and
         physiology and visual judgments (chaps. 32-3), to which he added the
         traditional optical topics of dioptrics and catoptrics, or vision by means
         of refracted and reflected light (chaps. 34-5).
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         Consideration of the Mind," as well as from the (metaphysical) consideration
         of the mind’s essence and its interaction with body.55  More generally,
         Descartes had called for an investigation of the knowing power in the _R_e_g_u_l_a_e
         (circulated in manuscript and published in 1701), without implying that this
         was a "physical" or "natural philosophical" investigation.56
         Psychological Loci in the Eighteenth Century
              The study of the mind, displaced from its subdisciplinary status in the
         Aristotelian curriculum, was refounded and pursued along many lines in the
         eighteenth century.  A Christian apologetical approach was pursued in works by
         gentlemen and divines on the soul.57  In discussions of Enlightenment
         psychology, the diametrically opposed materialism of the _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_e_s and their
         Scottish counterparts--including Diderot, d’Holbach, Helvetius, Priestley, and
         Bentham--has received recent attention, as part of the conventional story of
         the Enlightenment banishment of spirits and the alliance of materialism with
         progressive thought and politics.58
              Between these two extremes lay the largest and richest body of
         literature, that of the manifold programs for adopting an empirical approach
         to mind and its relation to body.  There was not one program for studying the
         mind empirically, and there was not a single disciplinary matrix for doing so.
         _________________________
         55.  John Locke, _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _C_o_n_c_e_r_n_i_n_g _H_u_m_a_n_e _U_n_d_e_r_s_t_a_n_d_i_n_g (London, 1690),
         I.i.2; further discussion in Hatfield, _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, 28-31.
         56.  Descartes, _R_e_g_u_l_a_e _a_d _d_i_r_e_c_t_i_o_n_e_m _i_n_g_e_n_i_i, in _O_p_u_s_c_u_l_a _p_o_s_t_h_u_m_a
         (Amsterdam, 1701), rules 8, 12, pp. 23, 32-5.  A translation of the _R_e_g_u_l_a_e
         into Netherlandish had appeared in 1684.
         57.  E.g., T. E., "a gentleman," _V_i_n_d_i_c_i_a_e _m_e_n_t_i_s: _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _o_f _t_h_e _B_e_i_n_g _a_n_d
         _N_a_t_u_r_e _o_f _M_i_n_d (London, 1702), and John Broughton (ca. 1673-1720; chaplain
         to the Duke of Marlborough), _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a: _o_r, _A_n _A_c_c_o_u_n_t _o_f _t_h_e _N_a_t_u_r_e _o_f
         _t_h_e _R_a_t_i_o_n_a_l _S_o_u_l (London, 1703), which sought to show the immateriality and
         immortality of the soul by means of natural reason.
         58.  Simon Schaffer, "States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy,"
         in _L_a_n_g_u_a_g_e_s _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_e, ed. G. S. Rousseau (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford:
         University of California Press, 1990), 233-90.
                                             - 28 -
         Rather, in diverse established, relocated, and newly created disciplinary
         matrices, the empirical study of mental phenomena was proposed, projected,
         recounted from books, attempted for real, and sometimes achieved.  The
         disciplinary matrices included the traditional Aristotelian structure and the
         various replacements for it, including the study of the mind as an attempt to
         understand the basis of human knowledge; the newly founded and widely
         influential Wolffian matrix in Germany; various midcentury projects to bring
         new methods to the study of the soul, including that of the Swiss naturalist
         Charles Bonnet and those of the French physician Guillaume-Lambert Godart and
         the German physician Johann Gottlob Kr"uger; the "science of the mind" allied
         with Scottish moral philosophy; the avowedly nonmetaphysical
         "Ehrfahrungsseelenlehre"; and treatments of mind in the established contexts
         of medical physiology, optics, and anthropology.  The contexts in which new
         empirical or conceptual results were achieved included medical physiology and
         optics, appeals to common experience organized by new theoretical structures,
         and demonstration measurements to illustrate the possibility of quantitative
         handling of mental phenomena.  Appeals to Newtonian method were legion and
         varied, exemplifying the many possibilities for claiming "Newtonian" heritage
         in the eighteenth century, many of which did not require quantitative data or
         mathematical derivations, but simply an empirical (Newtonian) as opposed to a
         metaphysical (Cartesian) starting point.59  Medical physiology provided an
         even more general model for natural science: that of natural history and
         clinical observation.  This model was operative in Locke, David Hartley, and
         Thomas Reid, and in physiologists such as Albrecht von Haller and Johann
         _________________________
         59.  For an appreciation of the variety of senses in which a "Newtonian"
         approach to natural philosophy might be understood, see Chambers,
         _C_y_c_l_o_p_a_e_d_i_a, vol. 2, "Newtonian Philosophy"; also, I. B. Cohen, _N_e_w_t_o_n_i_a_n
         _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), part 1.
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         Blumenbach, who discussed the mental faculties extensively in their
         physiological lectures.
              Charting a detailed road map through this diverse material would require
         discussion of nearly one hundred different works.  What I aim for here is a
         survey of the most visible empirical approaches to the mind, an account of
         their main features, and a report and analysis of their self-ascribed
         disciplinary locations.  This survey will provide a reasonably accurate
         overview of natural-scientific psychology remade during the eighteenth
         century.  Omitted are some self-avowed empirical approaches to the mind that
         treat it as a knowing or truth-discerning power rather than as an object of
         natural science, even if such approaches contain psychological material.
         Especially noteworthy among those omitted are the purely naturalistic analyses
         of the abb’e de Condillac and Johann Christian Lossius.  Also omitted are
         nonnaturalistic considerations of the knower, such as that of Kant.60
         Wolffian Psychology
              Christian Wolff created the paired disciplines of empirical and rational
         psychology, which he ordered coordinately with ontology, rational cosmology,
         and natural theology under metaphysics.61  His efforts have been the butt of
         many jokes in the history of psychology, most notably of Wilhelm Wundt’s
         famous jest that Wolff’s rational psychology "contains about as much
         experience as the empirical, and the empirical about as much metaphysics as
         the rational."62  In the standard historiography, Wolff is part of the
         metaphysical past of psychology’s prehistory.  In fact, Wolff’s work was of
         _________________________
         60.  On Lossius and Kant, see Hatfield, _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, chap. 3.
         61.  Wolff, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, #79; see also Alexander Gottlieb
         Baumgarten (1714-1762; professor of philosophy at Halle), _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a, 7th
         ed. (Halle, 1779).
         62.  Wilhelm Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_z"_u_g_e _d_e_r _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_s_c_h_e_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 3d ed.
         (Leipzig, 1887), 7.
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         paramount importance for the development of empirical psychology during the
         eighteenth century and beyond.
              Wolff’s imposing row of textbooks (in German and Latin) contain an
         interesting conception of philosophical method and a novel division of the
         sciences.  Wolff separated all knowledge into three types: historical, or
         knowledge of bare facts; philosophical, or knowledge of reasons; and
         mathematical, or knowledge of the quantities of things.  According to Wolff,
         philosophy is related to the other two sorts of knowledge in the following
         way: it is grounded in facts, and its method of reasoning is like that of
         mathematics.63  Wolff’s works are organized according to a highly articulated
         division of the sciences (or the branches of demonstrative knowledge).  Most
         generally, he retained the Aristotelian division between "philosophical"
         disciplines, which in his case included "physics," and "mathematical"
         disciplines, in which he included "mechanics" (taken as the theory of
         machines).64  Central components of the philosophical disciplines included
         "logic" (or "the science of directing the faculty of cognition in cognizing
         truth"), metaphysics, physics, and practical philosophy.  Physics was the
         science of corporeal nature in general and included general physics, empirical
         cosmology, orycthology (science of fossils), hydrology, phytology, physiology
         and pathology, and teleology.  Metaphysics was much expanded over its
         Aristotelian and Cartesian counterparts, to include ontology, general
         _________________________
         63.  Wolff, _L_o_g_i_c_a, preliminary discourse, chaps. 1-2.
         64.  Christian Wolff’s most general division of philosophy and its
         distinction from mathematical disciplines is given in his _C_o_g_n_i_t_i_o_n_e_s
         _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_e_s _d_e _v_i_r_i_b_u_s _i_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_s _h_u_m_a_n_i, new ed. (Frankfurt and Leipzig,
         1740; first translated from German in 1730), prolegomena, ##10-15; mechanics
         and statics, considered as the sciences of motion and equilibrium, were
         considered together, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_a _m_a_t_h_e_s_e_o_s _u_n_i_v_e_r_s_a_e, new ed., 5 vols. (Halle,
         1733-42), vol. 2, "Elementa mechanicae et staticae."  As Wolff understood
         the mathematical division of knowledge, it also contained portions depending
         on facts: the "mixed" mathematical sciences of optics, astronomy,
         chronologie, geography, etc.
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         cosmology, psychology, and natural theology (the latter two comprising
         pneumatology).65  General cosmology extended to the nature of body and of the
         elements, the laws of motion, and the distinction between natural and
         supernatural.66  Ontology, general cosmology, and psychology, although classed
         as divisions of metaphysics, were nonetheless advertised as empirically based.
         Metaphysics did not imply for Wolff, as it had for Descartes and would for
         Kant, a body of knowledge known through reason alone, independent of
         experience.  Rather, it was defined by its subject matter, as "the science of
         being, of the world in general, and of spirits."67  Metaphysics, as all
         philosophical knowledge, is based in "historical cognition," that is, in the
         cognition of facts.68  Wundt’s jest about the intermixture of empirical and
         metaphysical content, as clever as it may seem, betrays a total lack of
         comprehension of Wolff’s position, simply repeating an earlier and mistaken
         interpretation that most likely resulted from reading Kantian terminology
         (regarding metaphysics and the pure a priori) back onto Wolff.
              Thus, although Wolff placed psychology within metaphysics rather than
         physics, he nonetheless held it to be an empirical science.  Indeed, contrary
         to later interpretations of his work, Wolff maintained that empirical was more
         basic than rational psychology, because it provided the first principles from
         which the latter constructed its demonstrative arguments.  Within empirical
         psychology, the chief problem was to chart the faculties of the soul.
         _________________________
         65.  Wolff, _L_o_g_i_c_a, preliminary discourse, chap. 3.
         66.  Christian Wolff, _C_o_s_m_o_l_o_g_i_a _g_e_n_e_r_a_l_i_s, new ed. (Frankfurt, 1737).
         67.  Wolff, _L_o_g_i_c_a, preliminary discourse, #78.  In Wolff’s view metaphysics
         uses some principles, including the principles of sufficient reason and
         contradiction, that are grounded in the powers of mind and not derived from
         observations of external objects, but the attribution of these principles as
         basic logical and metaphysical principles is, according to Wolff,
         empirically based on the mind’s reflective awareness of its own operations
         in making judgments: _O_n_t_o_l_o_g_i_c_a, ##27-9.
         68.  Wolff, _L_o_g_i_c_a, preliminary discourse, #10.
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         Rational psychology then sought to find principles in empirical psychology
         such as could guide demonstrative explanations of the phenomena.  Thus, where
         empirical psychology established that the soul or mind perceives or represents
         external objects, it fell to rational psychology to give an account of the
         representational relation, which Wolff explained in terms of similitude
         (drawing liberally on other portions of empirical psychology and on
         ontology).69  And where empirical psychology established that sensations arise
         through alterations in the sense organs and that light causes alterations in
         the organ of sight, rational psychology explained the basis of spatial
         representation in general, gave an account of the means by which external
         objets affect the sense organs, and sought to explain vision by appealing to
         the relation between such effects and the consequenses for sight (drawing on
         optics).70  Psychological topics pertaining to individual mental faculties and
         their empirical characteristics were considered under other divisions of
         Wolffian philosophy: Wolff’s physics provided a summary discussion of the
         senses, as did his experimental physics for selected problems.  His optics
         examined the theory of vision, including optical anatomy; color; the
         perception of size, shape, position, and motion; and single vision with two
         eyes.  His physiology, understood as the study of the uses of the parts of
         living things, discussed the construction of the senses, nerves, and brain and
         their service as instruments of sensation.71
              Wolff’s psychology is paradigmatic of the allegedly regressive tendencies
         _________________________
         69.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##23-4; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, ##83-91.
         70.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##65-9; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, ##103-45.
         71.  Wolff, _V_e_r_n"_u_n_f_f_t_i_g_e _G_e_d_a_n_c_k_e_n _v_o_n _d_e_n _W"_u_r_c_k_u_n_g_e_n _d_e_r _N_a_t_u_r (Halle,
         1723), chap. 14; idem, _A_l_l_e_r_h_a_n_d _N"_u_t_z_l_i_c_h_e _V_e_r_s_u_c_h_e, _d_a_d_u_r_c_h _z_u _g_e_n_a_u_e_r
         _E_r_k"_a_n_t_n_i_s_s _d_e_r _N_a_t_u_r _u_n_d _K_u_n_s_t _d_e_r _W_e_g _g_e_b"_a_h_n_e_t _w_i_r_d, 3 vols. (Halle, 1727-
         29), part 3, chap. 8 (vol. 3); idem, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_a _m_a_t_h_e_s_e_o_s, "Elementa opticae"
         (3:1-100); idem, _V_e_r_n"_u_n_f_f_t_i_g_e _G_e_d_a_n_c_k_e_n _v_o_n _d_e_m _G_e_b_r_a_u_c_h_e _d_e_r _T_h_e_i_l_e _i_n
         _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n, _T_h_e_i_r_e_n _u_n_d _P_f_l_a_n_t_z_e_n (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1725), chap. 5.
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         of prescientific, speculative or metaphysical psychology: it is organized
         around the study of mental faculties, and it adopts a realistic attitude
         toward the soul considered as an immaterial substance.  Histories of
         psychology typically take a dismissive attitude toward faculty psychology, an
         attitude that usually stands without argumentative backing, except as conveyed
         through allusions to Moli‘ere’s joke about the dormitive virtue of opium.  Such
         histories are also openly dismissive of the posit of immaterial substances,
         sometimes "explaining" such posits by mentioning the assumed religious
         convictions of past thinkers.72  In each case, historians have failed to take
         a properly empirical and contextualist approach to past thinkers.
              In the context of the eighteenth century, Wolffian psychology was a
         progressive research program.  It promulgated an empirical approach to the
         mind, a kind of empiricist realism.  It was "realistic" in that it took
         seriously its theoretical posits; it was empiricist in that it claimed to base
         its posits on repeatable observation or "stable experience."  In organization,
         the general framework of Wolffian empirical psychology was similar to that of
         Cartesian psychology: it divided the faculties of the soul into cognitive and
         appetitive and distinguished "higher" and "lower" species of each.  In
         content, however, it was closer to Aristotelian theory, because it treated
         volition as a species of cognition rather than as a separate mental power.
         Its basic conformity to the Aristotelian and Cartesian denumeration of
         faculties, including sense, imagination, memory, and intellect, does not
         conflict with the empirical nature of Wolff’s psychology; the attribution of
         these faculties to humans is surely based on experience.  But this much
         empirical content was shared by many discussions of the soul or mind from
         _________________________
         72.  Boring, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 162; Robinson, _I_n_t_e_l_l_e_c_t_u_a_l
         _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 259, 265, 301.
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         Aristotle onward.  What, then, was new with Wolff?
              Wolff’s psychology had novel features in both content and methodology.
         Its major methodological innovation was the explicit enjoinder to adopt a
         metaphysically modest empiricist attitude toward mental faculties and
         phenomena: they were to be studied by attending to their operations while
         holding metaphysical speculation in abeyance.  When rational psychology seeks
         to explain the facts thus attained, it draws upon empiricaly established
         generalizations rather than allegedly pure a priori metaphysical insights into
         the essences of things in order to determine appropriate explanatory (we would
         say "theoretical") principles.73  Within this scheme, the empirically based
         attribution of mental faculties to human cognizers is not intended to be
         _e_x_p_l_a_n_a_t_o_r_y (as was the dormitive virtue of Moli‘ere’s joke), but to be
         _d_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_v_e of a unified capacity of the mind.  Such descriptions, being
         classificatory, are not atheoretical; but because they were not intended to be
         explanatory, they are not subject to Moli‘ere’s joke (any more than are current
         psychological investigations of cognitive and perceptual capacities).74
         Within his empiricist program, Wolff claimed that psychological states, and
         particularly those pertaining to pleasure and pain, are subject to
         quantitative measurement and mathematical laws, although he did not himself
         formulate a calculus of pleasure.  He also suggested that the goodness of
         _________________________
         73.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##1-4; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, ##1-3.  For
         English translation and discussion, see Robert J. Richards, "Christian
         Wolff’s Prolegomena to Empirical and Rational Psychology: Translation and
         Commentary," _P_r_o_c_e_e_d_i_n_g_s _o_f _t_h_e _A_m_e_r_i_c_a_n _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _S_o_c_i_e_t_y, 124 (1980):
         227-39.
         74.  Jerry Fodor jocularly defends faculty psychology in his _M_o_d_u_l_a_r_i_t_y _o_f
         _M_i_n_d (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983).  More seriously, the organization
         of psychology textbooks has long born the stamp of the traditional division
         of faculties, as psychologists have studied the functionally characterized
         faculties of cognition, including perception, learning, and memory, and more
         specific capacities, such as visual perception, and within vision, color,
         shape, and motion perception.
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         one’s memory can be estimated by the temporal latency of response to a memory
         demand, from the number of tries it takes to retrieve from memory, and from
         the number of acts it takes to fix an item in memory.  He suggested a
         corresponding quantitative estimate for the size of memory.75
              In content, the Wolffian psychology was noteworthy for its analysis and
         discussion of the faculties of imagination, attention, and reflection.  Wolff
         distinguished imagination proper, which simply reproduces sensory materials,
         from the faculty of "feigning" or producing new representations (_f_a_c_u_l_t_e
         _f_i_g_e_n_d_i).  He described the "law of imagination," a law of association through
         simultaneity.  And he discussed attention and its subspecies, "reflection" (or
         attention to the content of one’s perceptions), including impediments to their
         exercise.76
              The Wolffian system was widely influential on the Continent, where it
         displaced the fading Aristotelian and Cartesian school philosophies.  Its
         influence was strongest in Germany, where Wolff’s works or the numerous
         textbooks that arose in their wake were used even by authors who no longer
         subscribed to their precepts, including Immanuel Kant.77  The system was
         rendered into French by the Berlin Wolffian, Jean Deschamps.78  Wolff’s
         psychology was discussed with appreciation in the article on the soul (_A_m_e) in
         _________________________
         75.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##190-194.
         76.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, part 1, section 2, chaps. 3-4; section 3,
         chap. 1; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, part 1, section 1, chaps. 3-4.
         77.  The following textbooks follow Wolff in the disciplinary placement and
         the basic content of his empirical and rational psychology: Georg Bernhard
         Bilfinger, _D_e_l_u_c_i_d_a_t_i_o_n_e_s _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_e _d_e _D_e_o, _a_n_i_m_a _h_u_m_a_n_a, _m_u_n_d_o, _e_t
         _g_e_n_e_r_a_l_i_b_u_s _r_e_r_u_m _a_f_f_e_c_t_i_o_n_i_b_u_s (Tubingen, 1725); Ludwig Philipp Th"ummig,
         _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_i_o_n_e_s _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _W_o_l_f_i_a_n_a_e, 2 vols. (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1725-
         26); Johann Peter Reusch, _S_y_s_t_e_m_a _m_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_u_m (Jena, 1735); Friedrich
         Christian Baumeister, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_i_o_n_e_s _m_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a_e: _O_n_t_o_l_o_g_i_a_m, _c_o_s_m_o_l_o_g_i_a_m,
         _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a_m, _t_h_e_o_l_o_g_i_a_m _d_e_n_i_q_u_e _n_a_t_u_r_a_l_e_m _c_o_m_p_l_e_x_a_e (Wittenberg and Zerbst,
         1738); Baumgarten, _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a.  Kant used Wolff’s mathematics texts, and
         Baumgarten’s _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_s (including psychology).
         78.  Jean Deschamps, _C_o_u_r_s _a_b_r’_e_g’_e _d_e _l_a _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e _w_o_l_f_i_e_n_n_e, 2 vols.
         (Leipzig and Amsterdam, 1743-47).
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         the _E_n_c_y_c_l_o_p’_e_d_i_e, and his classification of psychology under metaphysics and
         his division of the discipline into empirical and rational were featured
         prominently in the article on "Psychologie."79
         New Empirical Approaches to Mind: Kr"uger, Godart, Bonnet
              Near midcentury there was a burst of new psychological activity in Scot-
         land, France, Switzerland, and Germany, with various authors essaying to apply
         the methods of natural history, natural philosophy, or medicine to the study
         of the mind.  I will take up the Scottish work, including that of Hartley, in
         the section following.  In the present section we will consider the new
         psychologies of the physicians Kr"uger and Godart and the naturalist Bonnet.
              Johann Gottlob Kr"uger, in his _V_e_r_s_u_c_h _e_i_n_e_r _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e of
         1756,80 set himself the task of showing "how the soul can be known through
         experiment," that is, of creating an experimental science of mind coordinate
         with the experimental science of body.  This was, he recognized, a formidable
         task.  At the same time, he believed that his experience as a physician would
         be of help, for it gave him access to "natural experiments" that arise in
         brain-damaged patients.  More generally, he wanted to show philosophers that
         medicine could make a contribution to philosophical knowledge of the soul, and
         also that mathematics could be applied to this subject matter.  Indeed, in his
         earlier _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e (1740-49), he had already proposed a mathematical
         (proportional) formulation of the relations among the force with which
         external objects affect the nerves, the resultant nerve activity, and the
         _________________________
         79.  _E_n_c_y_c_l_o_p’_e_d_i_e, _o_u _D_i_c_t_i_o_n_n_a_i_r_e _r_a_i_s_o_n_n’_e _d_e_s _s_c_i_e_n_c_e_s, _d_e_s _a_r_t_s _e_t _d_e_s
         _m_e_t_i_e_r_s, eds. Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, 17 vols. (Paris,
         1751-65), 1:338, 13:543.
         80.  Johann Gottlob Kr"uger (1715-59), _V_e_r_s_u_c_h _e_i_n_e_r _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e
         (Halle and Helmst"adt, 1756).  Kr"uger studied philosophy and medicine at
         Halle, receiving degrees in 1737 and 1742, becoming doctor and professor of
         philosophy and medicine in 1743; in 1751 he became professor of philosophy
         and medicine at Helmst"adt.
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         liveliness of the resulting sensation.81  In essence, he attempted to bring
         the methods and results of physics (in the broad sense), the knowledge of the
         brain provided by physiology, and the case-history knowledge of the clinic
         together in order to form an experimental psychology, one that eschewed (as
         too difficult) metaphysical questions about the substance of the soul or its
         immortality.82  At the same time, he openly acknowledged his admiration for
         Wolff’s work in philosophy (including psychology), dedicating to Wolff his
         medical dissertation, which treated the "physical" topic _D_e _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_e (1742),
         and praising Wolff in his later "physical" works on sensation and his
         experimental work on the soul.83
              Kr"uger expected his experimental psychology to be met with skepticism:
         "Experiment, one will say, can be done only with bodies.  Is it being
         suggested that spirits [_G_e_i_s_t_e_r] be brought under the airpump, that their
         shapes be viewed under the microscope, that their forces can be weighed?"
         This particular sort of skepticism, he countered, rests on the mistaken
         conception that "no other instruments can be used in experiments with the
         soul, except those that we find in the instrument cabinet of the physical
         scientist [_N_a_t_u_r_f_o_r_s_c_h_e_r_s]."  But in Kr"uger’s view, "if the soul is considered
         to be so very different from the things that one studies in physical science,
         then completely different experiments will have to be undertaken."84  In any
         case, the skeptic might rejoin, experiment depends on observation.  Is the
         soul observable?  Certainly not by the senses, in the manner of external
         _________________________
         81.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, 3 vols. (Halle, 1740-49), part 2, ##316-17, 2:568-
         75.
         82.  Kr"uger, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, iii-v.
         83.  Kr"uger, _D_i_s_s_e_r_t_a_t_i_o_n_e_m _s_o_l_l_e_m_n_e_m _d_e _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_e _p_r_o _h_o_n_o_r_i_b_u_s _d_o_c_t_o_r_i_s
         (Halle, 1742), 3-6, 8-9 (the dissertation was completed in 1742, two years
         after Wolff’s return to Halle from Marburg); idem, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, #9,
         2:14-16; idem, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ix-x, in which he said he followed
         the Wolffian Baumeister in metaphysics (vi).
         84.  Kr"uger, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, 1-2.
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         objects: we do not see, hear, taste the soul.  Yet, Kr"uger maintained, we can
         become aware of the states of our soul through "inner sense."  We can also
         know the soul through its connection with the body, as when we come to know
         someone’s mental states through their reflection in her countenance.85
              Kr"uger distinguished experiment from observation, and he did not intend
         to rely merely on observations of the soul’s natural expression in inner
         experience and outer comportment; he was proposing a genuinely experimental
         study of the soul.  Experiment, as he understood the term, differed from mere
         observation in the following way: observation requires only the possession of
         working sense organs and a willingness to pay attention, while true experiment
         requires that we "put things into circumstances in which they would not
         otherwise come to be, and thereby ask Nature to show us, what she had resolved
         to conceal from our eyes."  Again, the link between soul and body makes it
         reasonable to seek such experiments: from changes in the soul, changes in the
         body are known (in perception), and from changes in the body, changes in the
         soul are known.  There is also the close relation between mind and brain.
         Kr"uger allowed that the investigator could not cut open human heads and
         selectively invade the brain to see what happens, but he remarked that such
         experiments could be undertaken with animals, and also that physicians have a
         chance to observe the effects of natural "experiments" in patients who have
         suffered brain damage.86
              An "experimental" science did not imply for Kr"uger, or for other
         eighteenth-century thinkers, an atheoretical collecting of facts, or the
         piece-wise construction of theory from facts.  In good empiricist fashion,
         _________________________
         85.  Ibid., 5-8.
         86.  Ibid., 15-21.  Earlier Kr"uger spoke somewhat wistfully of the days when
         "experiments," such as cutting out pieces of the brain to see what happens,
         were performed on human "delinquents," _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, #427, 2:726.
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         Kr"uger held that all knowledge and all concepts derive from sensory
         experience.  They arise, though, through the operation of reason.87  Kr"uger
         did not develop a theory of scientific method to account for the interaction
         of sensory experience and reason in the development of scientific theory.
         From his practice, it is clear that he drew heavily on currently accepted
         theory in interpreting experimental results.  In psychology, he drew on a
         physical understanding of external objects and their effects on the senses, on
         physiological knowledge of the nerves and brain as interpreted in accordance
         with a "mechanical" approach to nature, and on the theoretical framework
         available in previous works on psychology, including that of Wolff.
              Kr"uger’s debt to Wolff and his ability to press beyond his senior
         colleague are both evident in one of Kr"uger’s applications of mathematical
         reasoning to psychology.  Kr"uger adopted a vibratory conception of nerve
         activity, supporting his position with experimental results obtained by
         Giorgio Baglivi in vivisections of dogs.88  Given that sensations depend on
         the activity of nerve fibers, he postulated that the strength or liveliness of
         the sensation will vary with the force produced by the vibrating nerve fiber.
         This force in turn will vary with the force of the external object.  One might
         then suppose that the liveliness of the sensation will vary directly with the
         force of the external object, and this in fact is what Wolff had proposed,
         based on his own assumption about the vibratory nature of nerve activity.89
         Kr"uger, however, went beyond Wolff in the depth of his theoretical analysis
         (articulated most fully in his _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e).  Appealing to the physics of
         vibrations, he contended that the action of external bodies on individual
         _________________________
         87.  Kr"uger, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, 2-3.
         88.  Kr"uger, _D_e _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_e, 15-18; idem, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, ##308-9,
         2:551-8.
         89.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, ##136-41, pp. 109-12.
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         nerve fibers will depend on the "tension" (_t_e_n_s_i_o_n_e, _S_p_a_n_n_u_n_g) of those
         fibers.  The liveliness of the sensation will therefore depend on both the
         force of the external object and the tension of the nerve.  He formulated the
         relation as a mathematical proportion: allowing S and s to represent the
         liveliness of two sensations, V and v the action of the external object, and T
         and t the tension of each nerve fiber, then, in Kr"uger’s formulation,
         S:s=VT:vt.  Thus, if V is three times v and T is twice t, S will be six times
         livelier than s.  Individual differences in T-values might be found in the
         sensory apparatus of a single perceiver or in comparisons between or among
         perceivers.  While he had clear conceptions of how V might be determined
         (based on the physics of light and sound), he gave no indication of how S was
         to be measured or how sensations were to be compared to establish one as "six
         times" livelier than another, other than through the determination of V and
         assumptions about T.90
              As Kr"uger acknowledged in the preface of his _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, it
         did not contain much that was new.91  Most of the experimental results he
         reported were extant in the literature: his real contribution was to introduce
         medical observations and mathematical formulations to psychology.  He did not,
         however, accept the mathematical formulations of others uncritically: he used
         experience to evaluate extant theoretical claims.  In his treatment of vision
         in the _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, Kr"uger initially followed a tradition in the optical
         literature--rendered with mathematical rigor by Wolff--according to which the
         apparent sizes, horizontal distances, and motions of objects vary directly
         with visual angle or angular velocity.92  Although this definition of
         _________________________
         90.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, ##314-22, 2:567-60; discussed
         qualitatively, idem, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, 101-4.
         91.  Kr"uger, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-_S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, iii-v.
         92.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, ##369-79, 2:667-75.  Wolff, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_a
         _m_a_t_h_e_s_e_o_s, "Elementa opticae," chaps. 5, 6, 8.
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         "apparent" magnitudes was found in many technical works in optics, those
         writers with a keen sense of visual experience--including Descartes, George
         Berkeley, and Kr"uger’s French contemporary, Claude Nicolas Le Cat--observed
         that objects often do not seem to have the sizes, horizontal distances, and
         velocities assigned by this theoretical formulation, and so they introduced
         additional psychological considerations, including unnoticed judgments or
         associative connections, to explain the character of perceptual phenomena.93
         Kr"uger knew at least the portion of this literature that discussed the horizon
         moon (the so-called "moon illusion"), and he added, almost as an afterthought
         to his mathematical treament of "apparent" size, the observation that
         sometimes apparent size does not follow visual angle but is influenced by
         apparent distance, such that of two objects falling under the same angle, that
         judged to be further away is judged to be and appears larger than the other.94
              Kr"uger often made good use of the extant natural philosophical,
         physiological, and clinical literature in discussing the relation between
         nerve activity and sensations or the role of experience in the development of
         perceptual abilities.  He presented the experiment of the natural philosopher
         Edm’e Mariotte, who used two white dots on a black wall to demonstrate the
         existence of a "blind spot" at the point where the optic nerve enters the eye.
         Mariotte had interpreted his results as showing that the choroid, rather than
         the retina, is the seat of optical sensation, on the grounds that the retina,
         but not the choroid, is present in the blind spot.  Kr"uger appealed to his own
         _________________________
         93.  Descartes, _D_i_o_p_t_r_i_q_u_e, part 6; George Berkeley, _A_n _E_s_s_a_y _t_o_w_a_r_d_s _a _N_e_w
         _T_h_e_o_r_y _o_f _V_i_s_i_o_n (Dublin, 1709), sections 53-60; Claude Nicolas Le Cat
         (1700-68; M.D.), _T_r_a_i_t’_e _d_e_s _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_s _e_t _d_e_s _p_a_s_s_i_o_n_s, 2 vols. (Paris,
         1767), 2:441-84.  On early modern theories of size and distance perception,
         see Gary Hatfield and William Epstein, "The Sensory Core and the Medieval
         Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory," _I_s_i_s, 70 (1979): 363-84.
         94.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, #380, 2:675-7; also, idem, _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l-
         _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, 95-101.
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         previous arguments that the outer membrane and not the medulla (or marrow) of
         the nerve is the sensitive portion, in order to argue that the retina is not
         truly present in the blind spot, which, he argued, contains nerve marrow but
         not nerve membranes.95  However, although Kr"uger adopted a vibratory
         conception of the effect of objects on the nerves, he did not believe that
         such vibrations would be carried by delicate nerve membranes along the
         circuitous path to the brain.  Moreover, he held that the nerve fluid or
         animal spirits are necessary for sensations.  He thus concluded that
         sensations arise at the locus of the vibrations, when the latter set the
         animal spirits in motion.96  In support of this conclusion, he cited the
         observations of John Woodward on decorticized, decapitated, decardate, or
         otherwise vivisectioned pigeons, chickens, eels, snakes, frogs, flies, wasps,
         and spiders.  He used Woodward to support his conclusion that "sensibility" is
         found in the parts of animals themselves, even if separated from the brain,
         and that this sensibility is lost when the nerves dry out (and hence could not
         depend on vibrations of membranes alone, but requires the presence of nerve
         fluid).  At the same time, he held that in ordinary circumstances perception
         depends on the conveyance of motion to the brain via the animal sprits in the
         medulla of each nerve, while also contending that that the speed of
         transmission, which he thought likely to be equal to the speed of sound, was
         too rapid for investigators to be able to detect any noticeable difference
         between reports of sensations originating in the foot and in the head.97
         Kr"uger also reported the famous Cheselden case, to support the point that if
         _________________________
         95.  Kr"uger, _D_e _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_e, 20-2; _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, #312, 2:559-63.
         96.  Kr"uger, _D_e _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_e, 23-4 (where he quotes from Newton’s Query), 29-
         31; _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, part 2, #331, 2:607-8.
         97.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Halle, 1744-1755), part 2, ##330-
         32, 2:625-42 (on p. 641 he favorably cites Hermann Boerhaave on the
         elasticity of the animal spirits).  Kr"uger added several clinical reports to
         the second edition.
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         newborns saw things inverted because of the inverted retinal image, they could
         soon learn through experience to see things upright.98  Finally, in discussing
         the imagination, he reported as a generally accepted "law of imagination" the
         regularity with which, in imagining one thing, we come to imagine things that
         we previously experienced simultaneously with that thing, or things that are
         similar to that thing.  As an example, he offered the case of a microscopist
         who formed an aversion to cheese through the action of this law: having
         studied cheese mites under the microscope, he could not help but imagine those
         mites when eating cheese, an image that spoiled his appetite.99
              Not long after Kr"uger had completed his dissertation on the senses at
         Halle, Guillaume-Lambert Godart submitted a medical dissertation at Reims
         entitled _S_p_e_c_i_m_e_n _a_n_i_m_a_s_t_i_c_a_e _m_e_d_i_c_a_e (1745), which he later developed under
         the title _L_a _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e _d_e _l’_a_m_e (1755).100  The framework of Godart’s thought
         was largely Aristotelian: he attributed to humans a "rational soul" that is a
         "vivifying principle" that accounts both for the life functions of the body
         and for its power of thought;101 after considering the nature and seat of the
         soul (in part 1), he successively treated (in part 2) the "vital functions"
         (section 1), including nutrition and generation, and the "animal" and
         "intellectual" functions (section 2), including sensation, perception,
         imagination, judgment, the passions, memory, sleep, dreams, and the
         "metapmorphosis" of man through his terrestrial, spiritual, and eternal stages
         of life.  But he approached this subject matter with the empirical attitude
         and metaphysical chagrin characteristic of many eighteenth-century natural
         philosophers and natural historians: he abandoned any attempt to know the
         _________________________
         98.  Ibid., part 2, ##386, 2:718-24.
         99.  Kr"uger, _N_a_t_u_r_l_e_h_r_e, 1st ed., part 2, #430, 2:729-30.
         100.  Guillaume-Lambert Godart (ca. 1717-1794; M.D.), _S_p_e_c_i_m_e_n _a_n_i_m_a_s_t_i_c_a_e
         _m_e_d_i_c_a_e (Reims, 1745); idem, _L_a _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e _d_e _l’_a_m_e (Berlin, 1755).
         101.  Godart, _P_h_y_s_i_q_u_e _d_e _l’_a_m_e, 21.
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         nature of the soul, admitting that we have no more conception of its nature
         than we have of that of matter.102  Further, he devoted special attention to
         his use of the word "physical" in the title of his book: "although the word
         _p_h_y_s_i_c_s comes from _p_h_y_s_i_s which signifies _n_a_t_u_r_e and nothing more, a book that
         treats of the nature of the soul may receive the name of physics."  Indeed, he
         allowed, etymologically the word suggests the treatment of corruptible things,
         but natural philosophers treat of incorruptible atoms, so he may be allowed to
         consider the incorruptible soul under the same title.  In any event:
              that which seems to me principally to authorize that name, is the
              manner in which I consider my object: my treatise is neither
              pneumatological nor moral, but physical.  It concerns, it is true, a
              spirit,  but this spirit is not considered according to its
              substance, but in the physical relation it has with the body, and
              when it comes to its actions, that which concerns merit and demerit
              is left to the moralists.103
         His chief "physical" contribution was his dicussion of the seat of the soul,
         which, relying on observations made by Fran,cois de la Peyronie, he located in
         the _c_o_r_p_u_s _c_o_l_l_o_s_u_m.104
              The Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet was more prolific and more
         influential than either Kr"uger or Godart.  Although his early years were
         devoted to the natural history of insects, during which time he had little
         patience with metaphysics, around 1750 he came to see the interest in turning
         the techniques of natural history to the principal object of study for human
         beings, human beings themselves; his first psychological work, the _E_s_s_a_i _d_e
         _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, appeared anonymously in 1754, followed by the _E_s_s_a_i _a_n_a_l_y_t_i_q_u_e
         _________________________
         102.  Ibid., v-vi, 8.
         103.  Ibid., iii-iv, v-vi.
         104.  Ibid., pt. 1, chs. 3-4.
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         _s_u_r _l_e_s _f_a_c_u_l_t’_e_s _d_e _l’_a_m_e in 1760.105  As he said in the latter work, "I
         consecrated my first years of reason to the study of natural history; I am
         consecrating those of its maturity to more important study, that of our being.
         I have tried to study _M_a_n as I have studied insects and plants.  The spirit of
         observation is not limited to a single genre."  Although he often referred to
         psychology as a "metaphysical" discipline by contrast with physics, he also
         averred that he had put in his book "much physics and little of metaphysics,"
         a decision he defended by suggesting that very little can be known of the soul
         "considered in itself."  Like Godart, he intended to apply the method of
         physics (in the wide sense) to the study of the soul.  He found two points of
         methodological analogy.  First, he assigned two parts to psychology, one
         "historical" and one "systematic": "the first contains the exposition of
         facts; the second, their explanation" (similar to Wolff’s "empirical" and
         "rational" psychology).  Second, the only method he found viable for the
         purposes of investigating a new subject matter (rather than providing
         instruction in a well-known one) was the "method of analysis."  This method
         consisted in "anatomizing each fact, decomposing it down to its smallest
         parts, and examining separately all of these parts"; then "seeking the
         connections that tie these things to one another and to analogous things, and
         to find results that can turn into principles."106  Starting from facts of
         consciousness and behavior, Bonnet sought to establish the general principles
         _________________________
         105.  Charles Bonnet (1720-93; gentleman naturalist, psychologist, and
         religious thinker), _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e; _o_u, _C_o_n_s_i_d_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_s _s_u_r _l_e_s
         _o_p_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_s _d_e _l’_a_m_e, _s_u_r _l’_h_a_b_i_t_u_d_e _e_t _s_u_r _l’_e_d_u_c_a_t_i_o_n (London, 1755 [1754];
         translated into German, Lemgo, 1773); idem, _E_s_s_a_i _a_n_a_l_y_t_i_q_u_e _s_u_r _l_e_s
         _f_a_c_u_l_t’_e_s _d_e _l’_a_m_e, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1760; 2d ed., Copenhagen and Geneva,
         1769; translated into German, Bremen, 1770; Dutch, Utrecht and Rotterdam,
         1771).  New psychological material, along with a summary of the old,
         appeared in his masterpiece, _L_a _p_a_l_i_n_g’_e_n’_e_s_i_e _p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_q_u_e _o_u _i_d’_e_e_s _s_u_r
         _l’’_e_t_a_t _p_a_s_s’_e & _l’’_e_t_a_t _f_u_t_u_r _d_e_s _e_t_r_e_s _v_i_v_a_n_s, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1769;
         translated into German, Zurich, 1769-70).
         106.  Bonnet, _E_s_s_a_i _a_n_a_l_y_t_i_q_u_e, 2d ed., vii, xxiv, ix-x.
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         that govern the flow of ideas and the formation of motor habits, as governed
         by principles of association that direct the formation of habits in accordance
         with the laws of pleasure and pain.107
              Bonnet’s psychology shared many features characteristic of the new
         psychological naturalism: he accepted dualism and the immateriality of the
         soul, without claiming to achieve an analysis of the substance of the soul;
         his arguments for the soul’s immateriality sprang from the unity of
         consiousness as contrasted with the conglomerate nature of material
         mechanisms; like Kru"ger, he approached the activity of the mind through its
         connection with vibrations of nerve fibers and motions set up in nerve fluid;
         and he assigned the origin of all our ideas to sense.108  Some aspects of his
         thought are more particular: he developed the "mechanics" (brain fiber
         physiology) of each sense with special thoroughness; he developed the theory
         of association extensively, using it as a key to understanding the course of
         thought, and dwelling on the "mechanics" of association with an intensity
         similar to that of Hartley’s slightly earlier treatment; he analyzed the role
         of attention in strengthening certain ideas by "reacting" on nerve fibers in
         the brain; he held that the formation of intellectual ideas depend on
         language, and that exposure of language results in the formation of
         "intellectual fibers" that are the bodily counterpart to abstract notions; and
         he explored the implications of his psychology with respect to the power of
         education in the cognitive development of each person.109  Because of his
         heavy emphasis on the role of brain fibers in all thought processes, Bonnet’s
         _________________________
         107.  Ibid., chaps. 7, 9-11; _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, chap. 64.
         108.  Bonnet, _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, introduction, especially pp. 1-3; chaps.
         1-6, 35.
         109.  Ibid., chaps. 21-26; 27-31, 61-4; 7; 8-20; 66-70.  Many of the topics
         in the _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e recur in the _E_s_s_a_i _a_n_a_l_y_t_i_q_u_e (which often
         quoted the former work); some, such as freedom, received more extended
         analysis, while some, such as the discussion of education, were omitted.
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         work raised a suspicion of materialism; he was by no means a materialist,
         having devoted considerable effort to showing that the mind must be
         immaterial.  At the same time, he placed questions about the the substantial
         nature of the mind and its ideas, and about the mode of interaction between
         mind and body, beyond the pale of human reason.110
              The newly sounded call for a "physical" science of the mind, or for the
         application of the methods of natural history and natural philosophy to the
         subject mattter of mind, was not lost on generations subsequent to Kr"uger,
         Godart, and Bonnet.  Especially in Germany, their work was incorporated as
         part of the founding literature of the _E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e and empirical
         anthropology that developed in the second half of the century and continued
         through the following century, conditioning and being continued by
         philosophical and natural-scientific psychology and the self-proclaimed "new"
         experimental psychology of Wundt and others.111  We will return to these
         developments in Germany after examining the Scottish scene, which itself
         strongly influenced nineteenth-century developments in psychology in both
         Britain and Germany.
         Scottish Sciences of Man and Mind
              In the Scottish Universities of the first half of the eighteenth century
         the mind was studied in three areas of the revised Aristotelian curriculum:
         logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy (which discussed appetite).  By mid
         _________________________
         110.  Bonnet, _E_s_s_a_i _d_e _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, chaps. 34-7.  On Bonnet, see Lorin
         Anderson, _C_h_a_r_l_e_s _B_o_n_n_e_t _a_n_d _t_h_e _O_r_d_e_r _o_f _t_h_e _K_n_o_w_n (Dordrecht, Boston, and
         London: D. Reidel, 1982), and Raymond Savioz, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_e _d_e _C_h_a_r_l_e_s _B_o_n_n_e_t
         _d_e _G_e_n‘_e_v_e (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948).
         111.  The works of Kr"uger, Godart, and Bonnet were regularly mentioned in
         overviews of the psychological literature: Karl C. E. Schmid, (1745-1799;
         professor of philosophy at Jena), _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d ed. (Jena,
         1796), 143, 149; Carus, _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 598, 642 (Kr"uger and
         Bonnet only); Carl Hermann Scheidler (1795-1866; professor of philosophy at
         Jena), _H_a_n_d_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Darmstadt, 1833), 1:295.
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         century, a peculiarly Scottish phenomenon had occurred: within the university
         arts curriculum, the study of the mind in general became the special preserve
         of moral philosophy (as might be expected of the "moral sense" school).
         Thomas Reid, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, transformed moral
         philosophy into the examination of the "powers" of the mind.  At Edinburgh,
         the connection between mind and morals had been forged even earlier: from
         1708, the University had reserved a chair for the professor of moral
         philosophy and pneumatics; while the motivation may have been the relation
         between morals and the study of spiritual beings, when Adam Ferguson filled
         this chair in 1764 he answered to his title by making the "theory of mind" a
         proper part of his basic textbook, the _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y.112
              The fact that the study of the mind fell largely under moral philosophy
         in the Scottish arts curriculum does not imply that the mind was considered to
         be distinct from nature or from natural scientific methods of study and modes
         of explanation.  Indeed, it was characteristic of Scottish philosophers to
         adopt a naturalistic attitude toward the mind and its powers.  Hutcheson
         compared the moral sense, and the internal senses more generally, to other
         natural human capacities, and sought to investigate them by appeal to
         experience.113  Hume signaled his naturalistic intentions in the subtitle to
         his _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _H_u_m_a_n _N_a_t_u_r_e: _B_e_i_n_g _a_n _A_t_t_e_m_p_t _t_o _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_e _t_h_e _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l
         _M_e_t_h_o_d _o_f _R_e_a_s_o_n_i_n_g _i_n_t_o _M_o_r_a_l _S_u_b_j_e_c_t_s; in the introduction to the work, he
         explicitly compared his methods and modes of explanation to those of Newton.
         By the "experimental method" he meant no more and no less than an appeal to
         _________________________
         112.  Thomas Reid (1710-96), _O_n _t_h_e _A_c_t_i_v_e _P_o_w_e_r_s _o_f _M_a_n (Edinburgh, 1788).
         Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, 2d ed.
         (Edinburgh, 1773), part 2; the original version was entitled _A_n_a_l_y_s_i_s _o_f
         _P_n_e_u_m_a_t_i_c_s _a_n_d _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y.
         113.  Francis Hutcheson, _D_e _n_a_t_u_r_a_l_i _h_o_m_i_n_u_m _s_o_c_i_a_l_i_t_a_t_e, _o_r_a_t_i_o _i_n_a_u_g_u_r_a_l_i_s
         (Glasgow, 1730); _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_a_e _m_o_r_a_l_i_s (Galsgow, 1745), book 1, chap. 1.
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         experience in support of his claims; by "moral subjects" he included not only
         the study of the passions and of morals proper (virtue and vice) but also, and
         fundamentally, the "science of human nature."114  Hume portrayed his analysis
         of perceptions into impressions and ideas, simple and complex, and his appeal
         to the laws of association in explaining their interactions, as having
         revealed the basic elements and laws of the human mind.
              Hume was not unique in claiming to be the Newton of the mind; he shared
         invocation of Newton with David Hartley, Reid, and Ferguson.115  Hartley, like
         Hume, was not a university professor; like Kr"uger and Godart, he was a
         physician.  He shared with the other Scottish naturalists the division of
         phenomena pertaining to human beings into two realms: bodily and mental.  His
         major work, _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _M_a_n, was an attempt to ground the operation of the
         mind in association, and to explain association as the result of sympathetic
         vibrations among nerve fibers the brain.116  Reid, who was a physician as well
         as professor of moral philosophy, divided all of the objects of human
         knowledge into two realms, material and intellectual, and grouped the sciences
         that study the first under the heading of natural philosophy, while reporting
         that the branch of philosophy "which treats of the nature and operations of
         mind has by some been called Pneumatology."117  He allowed that the study of
         mind was less advanced than that of natural philosophy (aided as the latter
         had been by Galileo, Evangelista Torricelli, Johannes Kepler, Bacon, and
         Newton) and commended the hope that "human genius" would, in time, "produce a
         _________________________
         114.  Hume, _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e _o_f _H_u_m_a_n _N_a_t_u_r_e (see note 21 above).
         115.  Gladys Bryson, _M_a_n _a_n_d _S_o_c_i_e_t_y: _T_h_e _S_c_o_t_t_i_s_h _I_n_q_u_i_r_y _o_f _t_h_e _E_i_g_h_t_e_e_n_t_h
         _C_e_n_t_u_r_y (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945), 18-21, 138-139,
         145.
         116.  Hartley, _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n _M_a_n, 1:5, credited Locke and Newton for
         drawing attention to the importance of association and the theory of
         vibrations, respectively.
         117.  Thomas Reid, _E_s_s_a_y_s _o_n _t_h_e _P_o_w_e_r_s _o_f _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _M_i_n_d (London, 1827),
         vi.
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         system of the powers and operations of the human mind, no less certain than
         those of optics or astronomy."118  Reid portrayed the "philosophy of the human
         mind" as awaiting its Newton, but hinted that the time might well be nigh.119
         Adam Ferguson, in his telegraphic _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s _o_f _M_o_r_a_l _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, formulated
         natural laws of both matter and mind, distinguishing the latter from properly
         moral laws.  He defined moral philosophy as "the knowledge of what ought to
         be" and declared that "pneumatics, or the physical history of mind, is the
         foundation of moral philosophy."  The term "physical" is not used here to
         announce a physicalist or reductionist theory of mind; rather, it is used to
         mean "any general expression of a natural operation, as exemplified in a
         number of cases."  The natural laws of mind were named "physical" by Ferguson
         in order to contrast them with the moral laws that serve to guide conduct: the
         physical laws of mind are the natural laws of its operations.  Under this
         usage, pneumatics "treats physically of mind or spirit"; the branch of
         pneumatics pertaining to human minds is designated simply as the "theory of
         mind."  It is equated with "the knowledge of physical laws collected from
         fact, and applicable to explain appearances."120  Examples of the laws of mind
         include the facts that we are conscious of our "existence, operation, and
         will" and that perception takes place via media that do not resemble the
         object of perception.121
              To these Scottish theorists of mind must be added Erasmus Darwin, whose
         _Z_o_o_n_o_m_i_a; _o_r, _t_h_e _L_a_w_s _o_f _O_r_g_a_n_i_c _L_i_f_e of 1794-96 was dedicated, among others,
         _________________________
         118.  Ibid., vii.
         119.  Ibid., 31: This philosophy "has received great accessions from the
         labours of several modern authors; and perhaps wants little more to entitle
         it to the name of a science, but to be purged of certain hypotheses, which
         have imposed on some of the most acute writers on this subject, and led them
         into downright scepticism."  This "hypothesis" is the theory of ideas and
         mediate perception (ibid., Essay II, chaps. 8-12).
         120.  Ferguson, _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s, introduction, section 7; section 3.
         121.  Ibid., part 2, chap. 2, section 1.
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         to those who "study the Operations of the Mind as a Science."122  In this
         work, Darwin presented a sophisticated version of the associationist theory,
         replete with novel empirical observations, including some famous ones on
         afterimages.  Darwin stands out among the Scottish authors noted thus far for
         his materialistic theory of mind.  He allowed that the whole of nature may be
         "supposed" to consist of "two essences or substances," namely, "spirit" and
         "matter."  Spirit "possesses the power to commence or produce motion," matter
         "to receive and communicate it."  Living and sentient things possess a "spirit
         of animation," which is a vital principle residing in the brain and nerves,
         and subject to "general or partial diminution or accumulation" (and hence
         material).123  Darwin’s treatment of sensory perception and associative
         learning were particularly astute.  His works were translated into German and
         republished often, helping to introduce a sophisticated associationism into
         German psychological writings.  He is virtually singular as an eighteenth-
         century materialist (even if vitalist) who actually contributed to the
         development of psychological theory.
              Although the theory of the mind, or psychology, was pursued vigorously by
         Scottish philosophers and physicians, Scottish writers came regularly to
         denominate this branch of knowledge "psychology"--as opposed to pneumatics,
         theory of mind, science of mind, or philosophy of mind--only in the nineteenth
         century.  Dugald Stewart, who undertook an introductory textbook on the
         subject, chose the title _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _t_h_e _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _M_i_n_d.124  He
         dedicated his work to Reid, and drew upon the mainstream Scottish tradition.
         He placed himself in opposition to Erasmus Darwin and Joseph Priestley, whom
         _________________________
         122.  Darwin, _Z_o_o_n_o_m_i_a, 1:iii.
         123.  Ibid., 1:1; 41; 37.
         124.  Dugald Stewart (1753-1828; professor of moral philosophy at
         Edinburgh), _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _t_h_e _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _t_h_e _H_u_m_a_n _M_i_n_d (Philadelphia,
         1793).
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         he classified as materialists.  Priestley himself did not contribute to
         psychology, but brought out an abridgement of Hartley’s _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s.
         Ehrfahrungsseelenlehre
              While in the Scottish context investigators sought to make the mind an
         object of empirical investigation and to discover its "physical laws" as a
         prolegomena to morals, in Germany the science of the soul (or mind) was
         treated as an autonomous discipline--or as a subdiscipline of the science of
         Man--within the theoretical (as opposed to moral) sciences.  The framers of
         "Seelenlehre," "Ehrfahrungsseelenlehre," and "empirische Psychologie" aspired
         to such an empirical approach to the soul or mind.  Developed instances are
         found in the work J. F. Abel and K. C. E. Schmid.  Abel and Schmid placed
         empirical psychology within natural science proper, distinct from metaphysics;
         they considered psychology to be the branch of anthropology or _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n_l_e_h_r_e
         that searches for the general laws of the mind and its relation to the
         body.125
              Abel’s book exhibits a typical psychological textbook organization, with
         roots in the _D_e _a_n_i_m_a tradition.  After brief preliminary methodological
         remarks, it considers first the nature of the mind, its basic powers and
         organs, and especially its relation to the brain, and then it systematically
         surveys the chief faculties of mind: sense, imagination, attention, thought,
         _________________________
         125.  Jacob F. Abel, (1751-1829; professor of psychology and morals at the
         Karlsschule), _E_i_n_l_e_i_t_u_n_g _i_n _d_i_e _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e (Stuttgart, 1786), Einleitung;
         Karl C. E. Schmid, (1761-1812; professor of philosophy at Jena), _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 2d ed. (Jena, 1796), p. 8, 11-12.  Earlier works included
         Dietrich Tiedemann (1748-1803; professor of ancient languages at the
         Karlsschule), _U_n_t_e_r_s_u_c_h_u_n_g_e_n "_u_b_e_r _d_e_n _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1777-78);
         Johann Nicolas Tetens (1736-1807; professor of philosophy at Kiel),
         _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_s_c_h_e _V_e_r_s_u_c_h_e "_u_b_e_r _d_i_e _m_e_n_s_c_h_l_i_c_h_e _N_a_t_u_r _u_n_d _i_h_r_e _E_n_t_w_i_c_k_e_l_u_n_g, 2
         vols. (Leipzig, 1777), which, while applying the "psychological method" of
         observation (the method of the natural philosopher), did so to a restricted
         set of topics, namely, understanding, will, the nature of humankind,
         freedom, the nature of the soul, and the development of the soul.
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         feeling, and bodily motion.  Throughout, Abel attempts to show how all of the
         various powers and capacities of the mind can be reduced to one basic power,
         the power of representation, and how the materials on which the power of
         representation operates must all derive from sensory ideas aroused through
         stimulation of the sense organs.  As had become common in the eighteenth
         century, he showed an interest in quantitative measures where these were
         available; indeed, he gave quantitative values for the "briefest still
         perceivable duration" of an impression on the sense organs.  But the primary
         theoretical interest of the work was the discovery of "laws" governing the
         various faculties, including laws of association and attention.126  The laws
         of attention assumed an all-or-none "conquest" (_s_i_e_g_e_n) of attention by one or
         another representation.  Originally, the currently liveliest or most pleasant
         representation wins out, but through experience it may happen that a less
         lively or pleasant representation that has in the past been followed by more
         pleasant representations will win out; the attentional faculty then comes to
         be guided by means-ends considerations in choosing which representations to
         enhance through its own power.
              Many of the topics in Abel’s textbook, such as the perception of size,
         shape, location, and distance, and attentional "conquest," can be found in
         nineteenth- and in early- and late-twentieth-century textbooks.  But one set
         of questions would no longer be found after circa 1930: those pertaining to
         the existence and nature of the soul.  The framers of _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e typically
         argued that the soul is a separate substance from the body, and they did so on
         philosophical as opposed to religious grounds.  Abel repeated the widely used
         argument that the unity of consciousness requires a unified substance as its
         vehicle; but body is essentially conglomerate; hence, the simple substance
         _________________________
         126.  Abel, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ##148-163, 194-206.
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         that is mind must be distinct from body.  He took this argument to be an
         example of empirical investigation.  He divorced his investigation from
         "metaphysical" considerations that transcend experience, for example, about
         mind-body interaction.  Historians of psychology typically lump together talk
         of a separate thinking substance and of mind-body interaction as
         "metaphysics."  Here, an eighteenth-century author asserts a different
         dividing point.  He holds that empirical considerations can be brought to bear
         on the existence and nature of the soul.  He does not mean that one can simply
         introspect and discover the simple substance of the soul.  An argument is
         required: a theoretical structure must be fit to the "data" of inner sense.
         But he considered these questions on the soul to be empirically tractable, by
         contrast with the problem of mind-body interaction, which admits of multiple
         hypotheses that "save" the phenomena without differing empirically.  He
         excluded the latter, empirically undecidable problem from his _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e.127
              Schmid’s _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e is a more advanced textbook than Abel’s,
         and in particular it is filled with rich and detailed methodological
         discussions that are informed by previous writings, including those of Wolff
         and Kant.  These discussions include a precise delimitation of the
         disciplinary boundaries and relations of empirical psychology to anthropology
         more generally, a discussion of the empirical object and form of explanation
         of psychology, and a division of psychology itself into distinct sub areas.
         Schmid observed that some would limit the subject matter of psychology to the
         data of inner sense alone (as in fact Kant had done), but he argued that it
         should be defined more broadly, to include those "outwardly" observable
         phenomena of body that have a lawful relation with inner sense.  He thus
         included not only the introspective data of inner sense but observations of
         _________________________
         127.  Ibid., ##4-20.
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         the behavior of other humans and indeed the historical record of human
         behavior within the subject matter of psychology.  Again, he acknowledged that
         some would limit a science "in the strict sense" to those fields that could
         derive their main conclusions a priori (as Kant had maintained), but he chose
         to employ a concept of science "in the wide sense," as a "systematic body of
         knowledge, that is, one ordered according to principles"; when the concept of
         science is so understood, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e can be a science.  It seeks empirical
         generalizations (_R_e_g_e_l_n) and universal laws (_G_e_s_e_t_z_e) of mental life, which,
         Schmid is careful to observe, are to be regarded as theoretical laws of nature
         governing the operation of the mind, and not as the moral laws by which we
         seek to guide our behavior.128
              Schmid drew the boundaries of the empirical more narrowly than had Abel.
         He followed Kant in removing questions pertaining to the substantiality and
         simplicity of the soul from the domain of empirical investigation and
         relegating them to "dogmatic" metaphysics--for which he reserved the names
         "transcendental" or "pure" psychology, or "pneumatology," thereby deviating
         from Kant’s terminology.  Included here were questions pertaining to the
         independence, simplicity, personhood, spirituality, immutability, and
         immortality of the soul, as well as those pertaining to its real causal
         relation to body.  He used the terms "empirical" and "rational" psychology as
         Wolff had, to denote disciplines that are based directly on experience (or are
         a posteriori) and those that are based on the analysis of concepts that
         themselves are drawn from experience (and hence are "comparatively a
         priori").129  The rational part of psychology constructs explanations for the
         empirical generalizations and other data collected in the empirical part.
         _________________________
         128.  Schmid, _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 11-17.
         129.  Ibid., 18-26.
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              Having relegated the problem of the substantial nature of the mind to the
         domain of dogmatic metaphysics, Schmid adopted a position of "empirical
         dualism."130  Empirical dualism distinguishes soul and body on the grounds
         that the properties and phenomena revealed through outer and inner sense
         cannot be united under a single set of concepts.  Experience shows that the
         phenomena of each are lawfully related.  Empirical psychology charts lawful
         relations within the domain of soul, spirit, or mind, and between that domain
         and bodily processes.  Schmid’s work is particularly impressive for its
         detailed analytical treatment of psychological concepts informed by a thorough
         acquaintance with the psychological, anthropological, and medical literatures.
         Psychology in the Anthropological, Medical, and Optical Literatures
              This is not the place to survey the diverse set of works in anthropology,
         or the "Science of Man," that appeared in the eighteenth century.  However,
         two general points will help place the natural scientific approach to
         psychology with respect to the anthropological tradition.  First, anthropology
         was considered by many to be a more encompassing discipline than psychology:
         whereas the latter pertained to mind, anthropology considered the whole human:
         mind, body, and their union.  (Of course, anthropology was also narrower than
         psychology, in that the latter might treat of animal as well as human souls.)
         Consequently, one trend in anthropological treatises, so denominated, was to
         focus on problems of mind-body union, giving only a summary treatment of
         bodily functions (which were discussed in medical physiology) and mental
         functions (which were discussed in psychology), a description that fits Johann
         Karl Wezel’s _V_e_r_s_u_c_h "_u_b_e_r _d_i_e _K_e_n_n_t_n_i_s _d_e_s _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n (1784-85).131  Secondly,
         _________________________
         130.  Ibid., 189-90.
         131.  Johann Karl Wezel (1747-1819), _V_e_r_s_u_c_h "_u_b_e_r _d_i_e _K_e_n_n_t_n_i_s _d_e_s _M_e_n_s_c_h_e_n,
         2 vols. (Leipzig, 1784-85).
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         even those, such as Kant and Blumenbach, who took the science of man to
         pertain to human kind in its full empirical diversity--to include various
         individual, national, and racial types--began their anthropologies with an
         overview of what is common to all humans, or at least to all human minds.132
         Kant placed anthropology among the empirically based investigations of nature.
         He considered its evidence to come from self-observation, observation of
         others, and reports of others’ behavior, as found in fiction, travel
         literature, and history.  Yet the most extensive portion of his
         anthropological lectures concerns the properties and operations of the
         cognitive faculties in diverse empirical circumstances, including a discussion
         of the roles of vision and touch in the perception of three-dimensional solid
         shapes.
              Medical physiology had long included examination of the mental powers of
         humans and the physiological structure of the sense organs, nerves, and brain
         that serve them.133  This practice continued through the eighteenth century,
         and into the nineteenth and twentieth.  Albrecht von Haller’s physiological
         lectures are noteworthy for the extensive discussion and wealth of the
         citation in the six books (filling one large volume) devoted to the external
         and internal senses.134  These discussions referred to a great deal of
         literature, but were of mixed quality from a psychological perspective.  Thus,
         like Wolff, Haller simply equated apparent size with the visual angle
         subtended by an object in the field of view, whereas many of the authors he
         cited, including Berkeley and Le Cat, recognized that perceived size may take
         _________________________
         132.  Immanuel Kant, _A_n_t_h_r_o_p_o_l_o_g_i_e _i_n _p_r_a_g_m_a_t_i_s_c_h_e_r _H_i_n_s_i_c_h_t (Frankfurt and
         Leipzig, 1799); Johann F. Blumenbach, _D_e _g_e_n_e_r_i_s _h_u_m_a_n_i _v_a_r_i_e_t_a_t_e _n_a_t_i_v_a
         (G"ottingen, 1775).
         133.  Jean Fernel (1497-1558; physician and philosopher), _O_p_e_r_a _m_e_d_i_c_i_n_a_l_i_a
         (Venice, 1566), "Physiologiae," book 1, chaps. 9-10, and book 5.
         134.  Albrecht von Haller (1708-77), _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_a _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_a_e _c_o_r_p_o_r_i_s _h_u_m_a_n_a_e,
         8 vols. (Lausanne, 1757-66), vol. 5, books 12-17.
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         into account the perceived distance of an object.135  Beyond the five external
         senses, Haller discussed the "internal senses," under which he grouped
         intellect, will, and sleep.  In the section on intellect, he also discussed
         the faculties of memory and imagination, the cognitive acts of judgment, wit,
         and abstraction, and the conditions leading to truth and error, delirium, and
         foolishness.  His discussion of the intellect focused especially on the status
         of mental representations.  In particular, he advised that four different
         things must be kept distinct in discussing mental representations such as
         perceptions: (1) the external object, (2) its impressions on the sense organs,
         (3) the effects of these impressions as transmitted to the cerebrum, and (4)
         the representation of this effect in the mind.136
              Finally, the optical literature, which had long included psychological
         topics as part of a complete theory of vision, flourished under this
         description in the eighteenth century, even if some authors adopted the
         narrower Newtonian conception of optics.  The theory of vision addressed the
         act of seeing itself, especially the perception of size, shape, distance,
         motion, and color.  Berkeley’s _N_e_w _T_h_e_o_r_y _o_f _V_i_s_i_o_n, for instance, was widely
         known and often admired in the eighteenth century.  It introduced a new
         psychological theory into the theory of vision, by accounting for the
         connection among visual and tactual ideas via the mechanism of "suggestion"
         (association), which Berkeley opposed to the posited unnoticed judgments of
         previous optical writers, including Descartes.  Berkeley’s theory that touch
         educates vision through a process of learning was widely discussed in the
         eighteenth century; Berkeley and others claimed empirical support for his
         position from observations on the newly-sighted blind.137
         _________________________
         135.  Ibid., book 16, section 4, #29, 5:520-2.  Berkeley, _N_e_w _T_h_e_o_r_y _o_f
         _V_i_s_i_o_n, sections 53-60; Le Cat, _T_r_a_i_t’_e _d_e_s _s_e_n_s_a_t_i_o_n_s, 2:441-84.
         136.  Haller, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_a _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_a_e, vol. 5, bk. 17.
         137.  On Berkeley, see Margaret Atherton, _B_e_r_k_e_l_e_y’_s _R_e_v_o_l_u_t_i_o_n _i_n _V_i_s_i_o_n
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              Beyond these theoretical disputes, many authors engaged in geometrical
         modeling and empirical investigation of the phenomena of size, shape, and
         distance perception.  Because it was descended from optics, a mixed
         mathematical science, the theory of vision inherited geometrical modeling, and
         as the other mixed mathematical sciences appealed ever more to experiment,
         optics and theory of vision became experimental disciplines.  It is in optics
         and theory of vision, before and during the eighteenth century, that the first
         significant body of mathematical constructions and quantitative measurements
         were applied to mental phenomena.  It is here that we should look for the
         first success in quantitative, experimental psychology, though this work in
         sensory psychology was not credited to the name of "psychology" until the
         nineteenth century.
         Empirically and Theoretically Progressive Research Programs
              According to the usual sociological measure of progressiveness,
         psychology was a progressive discipline during the eighteenth century:
         academic appointments in psychology were made, courses were taught, the number
         of textbooks published per decade increased, and, near the end of the century,
         journals were founded (even if they failed within a decade).138
              In Britain the "theory of mind," conceived as a branch of natural
         science, was firmly entrenched by the end of the century, and it continued
         into the next.  In Germany, "psychology" so called was even more firmly
         entrenched as a discipline, and it continued to be taught throughout the next
         _________________________
         (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
         138.  These claims are supported by Carus’s _G_e_s_c_h_i_c_h_t_e and Schmid’s overview
         of the literature, _E_m_p_i_r_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, p. 142-156.  A reveiwer in the
         _A_l_l_g_e_m_e_i_n_e _L_i_t_e_r_a_t_u_r _Z_e_i_t_u_n_g of 1787 (supplement), while panning Christoph
         Meiners’ _G_r_u_n_d_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e (Lemgo, 1786), could speak of the great
         number of "textbooks of psychology" that are available.  It has been
         customary for writers of psychology textbooks, from Kr"uger and Bonnet on, to
         apologize for adding to such a crowded field.
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         century.  There were competing conceptions, of course, and in the second half
         of the nineteenth century some entrepreneurs proclaimed the founding of a
         "new" psychology, meaning thereby to distinguish themselves from the extant
         discipline.  This claim of novelty rested on a comparison with the old
         psychology, portraying it as "merely philosophical," which meant metaphysical
         and not experimental (i.e., not empirically based).
              I would like to make a stronger claim for the progressiveness of various
         eighteenth-century research programs that took a natural scientific attitude
         toward the mind or mental phenomena.  I propose as a working historical thesis
         that eighteenth-century work made a threefold contribution to the psychology
         of the nineteenth century.  First, eighteenth-century faculty psychology
         yielded a _c_o_n_c_e_p_t_u_a_l framework that was more fine-grained than that of earlier
         centuries and that benefited nineteenth-century investigations.  Second,
         eighteenth-century association psychology provided the _t_h_e_o_r_e_t_i_c_a_l framework
         that dominated much nineteenth-century psychology, the associationist
         framework.  Third, eighteenth-century experimental work, especially in vision,
         provided a tradition of _e_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l practice that, although not often counted
         as part of "psychology" so called during the eighteenth century, was
         incorporated into the "new" experimental discipline of psychology during the
         nineteenth century.  Further development of the long-standing tradition of
         experimental work on vision provided the primary foundation for the claims to
         found a new, experimental psychology.
              A survey of that subset of popular late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
         century psychology textbooks that treat psychology as a natural science would
         reveal that the structure of these books has much in common with scholastic
         textbooks of the seventeenth century: the external senses, their organs and
         associated nervous processes, are treated first; the "internal senses"
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         (usually not so called) are treated further on, including memory and
         imagination; higher cognitive faculties, including reasoning, further on;
         bodily motion, somewhere along the way; and appetite and will, near the
         end.139  We can discover the specifically eighteenth century contribution by
         finding those new chapters in these textbooks that have origins in that
         century.  The new chapters include those on attention, conception or
         abstraction, and association.  Attention was brought into psychology by the
         faculty tradition, particularly by Wolff and his followers, and was further
         addressed in _E_h_r_f_a_h_r_u_n_g_s_s_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, which proposed empirically discovered
         constraints on the scope and direction of attention.140  The chapters on
         discrimination and on conception or abstraction, though rooted in ancient
         Greek philosophy, were introduced into eighteenth-century psychology books by
         those developing the faculty approach.141  The added chapter on association
         was due largely to attempts by authors such as Hume and Hartley to make the
         laws of association the fundamental explanatory principles of mind.142
              Thus far my analysis of the "progressive" tenor of eighteenth-century
         psychology has been restricted to changes in psychological textbooks, which
         may or may not have claimed novel conceptual and theoretical results, and
         _________________________
         139.  James, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y; Edward B. Titchener, _O_u_t_l_i_n_e _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, new ed.
         (New York and London, 1901); Hermann Ebbinghaus, _A_b_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 4th
         ed. (Leipzig, 1912); Edward L. Thorndike, _E_l_e_m_e_n_t_s _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 2d ed.
         (New York, 1915); Wilhelm Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_r_i_s_s _d_e_r _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, 13th ed.
         (Leipzig, 1918); Carr, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y.
         140.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, part 1, section 3, chap. 1.  Abel,
         _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ##194-268.  Nicholas Malebranche previously had placed
         attention at the center of his discussion of method, _R_e_c_h_e_r_c_h_e _d_e _l_a _v’_e_r_i_t’_e,
         book 6, part 2, in his _O_e_u_v_r_e_s, 20 vols. (Paris, 1958-1970), vol. 2.
         141.  Wolff, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, part 1, section 3, chap. 1; _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a
         _r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_i_s, part 1, section 1, chap. 4; Abel, _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e, ##392-436.
         142.  Hume, _T_r_e_a_t_i_s_e, book 1, part 1, section 4; Hartley, _O_b_s_e_r_v_a_t_i_o_n_s _o_n
         _M_a_n, part 1, chap. 1, propositions 10-14, and passim.  Wolff described the
         phenomena of association and their law, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_a _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a, ##104, 117;
         his follower Baumgarten named "_a_s_s_o_c_i_a_t_i_o _i_d_e_a_r_u_m" the "_l_e_x _i_m_a_g_i_n_a_t_i_o_n_i_s,"
         _M_e_t_a_p_h_y_s_i_c_a, #561.
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         which only sometimes claimed to present original observations.  One might
         concede that this older tradition contributed conceptual materials to the
         textbooks of the new psychology of the nineteenth century, without accepting
         that the eighteenth century contributed to the rise of quantitative
         experimental psychology.  In point of fact, the strongest eighteenth-century
         contribution to the rise of quantitative experimentation in psychology came
         from the mixed-mathematical science of optics.
              Optics was a "mathematical" science in virtue of its use of geometrical
         constructions, especially in the tracing of "visual rays."  As regards vision
         proper, these rays were used in the analysis of the perception of size, shape,
         distance, and motion.  Mathematical (geometrical) regularities, such as that
         among visual angle, apparent distance, and perceived size, were typically
         expressed as proportions.  There were few numerical values in optics (indices
         of refraction being one).  In the seventeenth century Descartes gave estimates
         of the range within which accommodation and convergence could provide accurate
         information for the perception of distance, though he did not say how he had
         arrived at the values.  Berkeley, who introduced a conceptual revolution into
         the theory of vision with his doctrine of suggestion, did not cite
         quantitative observational evidence.143  The eighteenth century was replete
         with novel observations of sensory phenomena, including after-images and color
         blindness, which were not quantitative but were nonetheless important for
         that.144
              Nonetheless, there were quantitative studies of visual perception in the
         _________________________
         143.  On Descartes and Berkeley, see Hatfield and Epstein, "Sensory Core."
         144.  Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, "Dissertation sur les couleurs
         accidentelles," _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e, 60 (Paris, 1743):
         147-58.  John Dalton, "Extraordinary Facts Relating to the Vision of
         Colours: with Observations," _M_e_m_o_i_r_s _a_n_d _P_r_o_c_e_e_d_i_n_g_s _o_f _t_h_e _L_i_t_e_r_a_r_y _a_n_d
         _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_c_a_l _S_o_c_i_e_t_y _o_f _M_a_n_c_h_e_s_t_e_r 5 (1798): 28-45.
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         eighteenth century, among which I give three examples.  Patrick D’Arcy
         measured the persistence of visual impressions by devising an apparatus for
         presenting to an observer a luminous object (a live coal) with a circular
         motion whose diameter, velocity, and distance from the observer could be
         varied.  By observing how rapidly the coal must turn in order to result in the
         perception of a closed circle under a constantly fixed gaze, he concluded that
         the impression lasts for "8 tierces."145  Pierre Bouger examined the question
         of how lines must be rendered in perspective to yield an appearance of being
         parallel, which was a problem addressed by several mathematical theorists.  He
         introduced into the problem the notion of the apparent (as opposed to real)
         inclination of the ground plane, and measured the latter.146  Robert Smith
         undertook a thorough study of the moon illusion, which he explained in
         accordance with the hypothesis that for a given visual angle, perceived size
         varies with apparent distance.  He contended that the moon appears larger at
         the horizon because it seems further away than when it is overhead.  In
         support of this hypothesis, he undertook to measure the perceived curvature of
         the vault of the heavens, which informal observation suggested is flattened.
         He obtained numerical values by comparing the known position of the stars with
         the apparent bisections by visible stars of the angle between the horizon and
         straight overhead.147
              The practice of seeking precise measurements in testing theories of
         perception became more common in the nineteenth century and was particularly
         _________________________
         145.  Patrick D’Arcy, "Memoire sur la dur’ee de la sensation de la vue,"
         _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e 82 (Paris, 1765): 439-51.
         146.  Pierre Bouger, "Recherche sur la grandeur apparente des objets,"
         _M_e_m_o_i_r_e_s _d_e _m_a_t_h’_e_m_a_t_i_q_u_e _e_t _d_e _p_h_y_s_i_q_u_e 72 (Paris, 1755): 99-112.
         147.  Robert Smith, _C_o_m_p_l_e_a_t _S_y_s_t_e_m _o_f _O_p_t_i_c_k_s, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1738),
         1:63-6.  All three examples, along with others, are reported in Joseph
         Priestley, _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _a_n_d _P_r_e_s_e_n_t _S_t_a_t_e _o_f _D_i_s_c_o_v_e_r_i_e_s _R_e_l_a_t_i_n_g _t_o _V_i_s_i_o_n,
         _L_i_g_h_t, _a_n_d _C_o_l_o_u_r_s (London, 1772).
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         highly developed in German sensory physiology and psychology.  Wundt and
         Hermann Helmholtz drew upon earlier work when they brought sensory psychology
         into a position of scientific prominence, and not solely with respect to
         experiment; equally or more importantly, their theoretical conceptions were
         inherited from the highly developed theories of spatial perception that arose
         in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.148
         Conclusions
              Psychology or the science of the mind was conceived as a natural science
         in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.  The notions of
         _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y and _n_a_t_u_r_a_l _s_c_i_e_n_c_e underwent significant change along the way.  At
         first "psychology" was the science of the Aristotelian soul, and covered
         vegetative as well as sensory and intellectual powers; study of the latter,
         "cognitive," powers was a (dominating) subdiscipline in Aristotelian
         psychology.  Wolffians made psychology a part of metaphysics, coordinate with
         cosmology.  Scots placed psychology within moral philosophy, but distinguished
         its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct).  Several
         Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology.  Meanwhile,
         British and French visual theorists developed sophisticated theories of
         spatial perception and mathematically precise theories of size and distance
         perception; they created instruments to test these theories, and to measure
         other visual phenomena, such as the duration of visual impressions.  Nearly
         all of these investigators were dualists of one sort or another.  From early
         to late, the trend was to bracket metaphysical questions in favor of the
         search for empirical regularities and empirically based systems of
         classification.  These empirical studies were directed at mental phenomena
         _________________________
         148.  Hatfield, _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, chaps. 2, 4, 5.
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         considered as distinct from material phenomena.
              This being the case, psychology was not "invented" in the eigthteenth
         century, but remade.  Subsequently, a historical narrative according to which
         genuinely natural scientific psychology came into existence only in the second
         half of the nineteenth century has been invented.  It would be interesting to
         look into the historical coniditions that gave rise to it.  Wundt, in the
         first edition of his _G_r_u_n_d_z"_u_g_e, admitted considerable continuity between the
         old, empirical and observational psychology and the new experimental
         psychology that drew upon the methods of psychophysics, though he toned down
         the talk of continuity and stressed the differences in later editions.149  My
         guess is that the story of the invention of the new psychology will lead well
         into the twenteith century, and will include the narrative of experimentalists
         such as Edward Sripture and the Harvard experimental psychologist turned
         historian (and, perhaps in fact, founder), Edwin Boring.150
              My sketch of the early history of psychology challenges not only the
         usual historiography but also the usual conception of Enlightenment progress.
         In the standard narrative, the heroes of the Enlightenment are materialists.
         If psychology is to be made a science, the story goes, mind must be equated
         with matter and thereby rendered subject to empirical investigation.151  The
         problem is that no one bothered to tell the early practitioners of natural
         scientific psychology that they had to be materialists in order to be natural
         scientific psychologists.  In point of fact, of all the major eighteenth
         century authors who made contributions to the development of psychology, only
         Erasmus Darwin allowed that mind might be material; nineteenth-century
         _________________________
         149.  Wundt, _G_r_u_n_d_z"_u_g_e, 1-8; ibid., 3d ed., 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1887), 1:1-8;
         ibid., 5th ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1902), 1:1-8.
         150.  Edward Wheeler Scripture, _N_e_w _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y (London, 1898); E. G. Boring,
         _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f _E_x_p_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y (New York: Century, 1929).
         151.  Schaffer makes this position explicit in "States of Mind," 240, 263.
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         founders of psychology, including Wundt, Helmholtz, R. H. Lotze, Hermann
         Ebbinghaus, William James, Hugo Munsterburg, and Alfred Binet, banished the
         very question from scientific psychology.152  These authors conceived
         psychology as natural scientific without seeing the need to adopt the
         metaphysical position of materialism.  In so doing, they would seem to be
         proceeding quite rationally, by studying what can be studied on its own terms
         and avoiding an unnecessary commitment to the unsupported claim that mental
         phenomena can be reduced to material processes.  The old equation of
         Enlightenment Reason with materialism turns out to have been so much
         prejudice.  It would be interesting to discover the historical conditions in
         which this version of history became entrenched.  In the meantime, there is
         much work to be done investigating the history of psychology considered as the
         science of mental phenomena, a history in which faculty psychology is no joke,
         and in which materialism is virtually nowhere to be found.
         _________________________
         152.  Darwin, _Z_o_o_n_o_m_i_a, 1:108-9.  On antimaterialistic and nonmaterialistic
         stances in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychology (including Wundt,
         Helmholtz, and Lotze), see my _N_a_t_u_r_a_l _a_n_d _N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e, chaps. 6-7; James,
         _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y, 6-7; Hugo Munsterberg, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y: _G_e_n_e_r_a_l _a_n_d _A_p_p_l_i_e_d (New York
         and London, 1914), 39-42: Alfred Binet, _I_n_t_r_o_d_u_c_t_i_o_n ‘_a _l_a _p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e
         _e_x_p’_e_r_i_m_e_n_t_a_l_e (Paris, 1894), 146.
